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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Great Recession that began around the world in 2008 caused hard-
ship for millions. It has also prompted economists to re-evaluate what they
thought they knew about macroeconomics, and policymakers to question
the same in regard to policy. This thesis contains three papers, each of
which investigates a question prompted or made more salient by the events
of the Great Recession.
Throughout the crisis and across the industrialised world, policymakers
placed great emphasis on the ability of monetary policy to stimulate de-
mand and close the large negative output gaps that the crisis opened up.
This emphasis only increased as fiscal policy started to tighten after 2010.
For this policy mix to work, however, it is necessary for monetary policy to
have some effect when the economy is weak. The first substantive chapter
of this thesis investigates whether this is the case. We estimate the impulse
response of key US macro series to the monetary policy shocks identified by
Romer and Romer (2004), allowing the response to depend flexibly on the
state of the business cycle. We find strong evidence that the effects of mon-
etary policy on real and nominal variables are more powerful in expansions
than in recessions. The magnitude of the difference is particularly large in
durables expenditure and business investment. The asymmetry relates to
how fast the economy is growing, rather than to the level of resource utili-
sation. There is some evidence that fiscal policy has counteracted monetary
policy more in recessions than in booms. We also find evidence that contrac-
tionary policy shocks have more powerful effects than expansionary shocks.
introduction
But contractionary shocks have not been more common in booms, so this
asymmetry cannot explain our main finding.
The second paper also deals with interest rates, but with causes rather
than consequences, and with long horizons rather than the business cycle.
Over the past four decades, real interest rates have risen then fallen across
the industrialised world. Over the same period, nominal investment rates
are down, while house prices and household debt are up. In the second sub-
stantive chapter of this thesis, I explain these four trends with a fifth - the
widespread fall in the relative price of investment goods. I present a simple
closed-economy OLG model in which households finance retirement in part
by selling claims on the corporate sector (capital goods) accumulated over
their working lives. As capital goods prices fall, the interest rate must fall
to reflect capital losses. And in the long run, a given quantity of saving buys
more capital goods. This has ambiguous effects on interest rates in the long
run: if the production function is inelastic, in line with most estimates in
the literature, interest rates stay low even after relative prices have stopped
falling. Lower interest rates reduce the user cost of housing, raising house
prices and, given that housing is bought early in life, increasing household
debt. I extend the model to allow for a heterogeneous bequest motive, and
show that wealth inequality rises but consumption inequality falls. I test the
model on cross-country data and find support for its assumptions and pre-
dictions. The analysis in this paper shows recent debates on macroeconomic
imbalances and household and government indebtedness in a new light. In
particular, low real interest rates may be the new normal. The debt of the
young provides an alternative outlet for the retirement savings of the old;
preventing the accumulation of debt, for example through macroprudential
policy, leads to a bigger fall in interest rates.
Real interest rates have fallen still further since the onset of the financial
crisis of 2008, which was also associated with falls in corporate lending, busi-
ness investment, labour productivity and real wages in the United Kingdom.
The third substantive chapter of this thesis uses a large firm-level dataset of
UK companies and information on their pre-crisis lending relationships to
identify the causal links from changes in credit supply to the real economy
following the 2008 financial crisis. Controlling for demand in the product
market and conditional upon survival, it finds that the contraction in credit
13
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supply reduced labour productivity, wages and the capital intensity of pro-
duction at the firm level. Furthermore, firms experiencing adverse credit
shocks were more likely to fail, other things equal. The paper shows that
these effects are robust, statistically significant and economically large, but
only when instruments based on pre-crisis banking relationships are used.
Taken together, what can we conclude from this work? Chapter 2 shows
that nominal interest rates may need to be cut further than first thought in
recessions, because a cut of a given size has less effect. The average level of
nominal interest rates may therefore need to be higher to afford the mone-
tary authorities more space to cut them. In extremis, monetary policy may
not be sufficient to mitigate large recessions by itself, and may need to be
supplemented by additional tools of demand management, such as fiscal pol-
icy. Chapter 3 suggests that the long-run real interest rate may have fallen
for reasons independent of the business cycle, such that the inflation rate
will need to be higher to achieve a given steady-state nominal interest rate.
Macroprudential limits on household debt may exacerbate the tendency for
real interest rates to fall, and it may be preferable instead to target a higher
ratio of public debt to GDP. Between them, Chapters 2 and 3 provide argu-
ments that the inflation target should be increased to keep the normal level
of nominal interest rates a safe distance above zero. Chapter 4 suggests
that adverse credit shocks may have very large negative effects on the pro-
ductive efficiency of the corporate sector. This chapter attests to the large
aggregate costs associated with financial crises, and accordingly indicates
that measures to make them less frequent will be worthwhile even if these
measures themselves entail appreciable gross costs. Taken together, these
three papers suggest that there is much more to macroeconomic stabilisa-
tion than monetary policy, and that stabilisation is about the long run as
well as the business cycle: fiscal and macroprudential policy should perhaps
be used in conjunction with monetary policy to stabilise the business cycle,
but furthermore to avoid a dichotomy between low real interest rates and
high private debt, and stabilise the supply of credit.
14
Chapter 2
Pushing on a string: US
monetary policy is less
powerful in recessions
2.1 Introduction
Is monetary policy effective in recessions? In recent years this perennial
question took centre stage in the public policy debate, as central banks in
the United States and Europe faced the deepest post-war crisis. A priori,
whether monetary policy is more powerful in recessions or expansions is
unclear. Expenditure could be more or less sensitive to real interest rates
at different points in the business cycle. Imperfections in the financial sys-
tem might magnify or dampen the transmission of policy at different times.
Prices might be more or less sticky. And the systematic component of mon-
etary policy itself might behave differently. Previous work has studied this
question, and adjacent ones, finding mixed results.
We investigate this question anew on US data, and find strong evidence
that monetary policy shocks typically have much more powerful effects on
output and inflation in an expansion than in a recession. In order to allow
impulse response functions to depend on the state of the business cycle,
we adapt the local projection method of Jorda` (2005) and combine it with
the smooth transition regression method of Granger and Terasvirta (1994).1
1Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014) use a similar
pushing on a string: us monetary policy in recessions
We investigate the state-dependence of monetary policy impulse response
functions in this framework, examining the response of a range of real and
nominal variables to monetary policy shocks identified in the manner of
Romer and Romer (2004).
The main result from our investigation is that shocks to the federal funds
rate are more powerful in expansions than in recessions. Nearly all of the
effect we observe on average in the data is attributable to the effect in good
times, and in particular to the response of durable consumption and business
and household investment. In an expansion, output and then inflation fall
in response to a negative monetary shock in the textbook fashion. Within
this, and in line with previous findings, business investment and consumer
expenditure on durable goods and housing are substantially more sensitive
than other expenditures, whereas the responses of durables and nondurables
prices are much closer together. In a recession, in contrast, the response of
output and inflation to monetary policy interventions is negligible and gener-
ally insignificantly different from zero. These differences are not attributable
to differences in the amplification afforded by the response of credit prices
or quantities. We find that contractionary shocks are more powerful than
expansionary shocks - in line with Angrist, Jorda`, and Kuersteiner (2013),
who employ a different method. But given that they are equally common
in both expansions and recessions, this cannot be the source of asymmetry
across the business cycle. We study different indicators of the state of the
economy and find that measures of the growth rate of activity such as GDP
growth or NBER recession dates are the relevant determinants of monetary
policy effectiveness, whereas measures of the level of resource utilization such
as the output gap or the unemployment rate do not as clearly distinguish
regimes. We find that fiscal policy seems to have counteracted monetary
policy more strongly in recessions than in expansions, which provides one
explanation for our results.
These findings are relevant for the design of stabilisation policy and
the models used to analyse it. If changes in the policy rate have limited
impact in a recession, central banks will be more likely to need to resort
to other (unconventional) monetary policy measures to achieve the desired
procedure to study the effect of fiscal policy, though the method has never been applied
to the analysis of monetary policy.
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expansionary effect. Policymakers may also need to rely more heavily on
fiscal or financial policies to stabilize the economy in a deep or protracted
slump. On the modelling side, the findings call for macroeconomic models
that generate a higher sensitivity in the response of the economy (and in
particular, the durable-good sector) during expansions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews
the literature. Section 2.3 explains the empirical method and describes
the dataset. Section 2.4 sets out the main results. We conduct sensitivity
analysis in section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes with some thoughts for future
research.
2.2 Literature
There is a small empirical literature on how the impact of monetary policy
varies with the business cycle, mostly written a decade or more ago. Previous
research produced mixed results and, perhaps as a result, the mainstream
monetary policy literature, both theoretical and empirical, has largely ig-
nored the potential for asymmetries and their policy implications. See for
example Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Woodford (2011) and
Gali (2008). Our paper makes use of important subsequent methodologi-
cal innovations in the estimation of impulse response functions in regime-
switching environments.
The closest paper to ours in terms of implementation is Weise (1999).
Weise (1999) estimates regime-dependency with a smooth-transition tech-
nique (Granger and Terasvirta (1994)), as do we, but applies this to a VAR
rather than a local projection model. The set of variables in the VAR is
small: industrial production, consumer prices, and M1, detrended in com-
plicated piecewise fashion over 1960Q2-1995Q2. Monetary shocks are iden-
tified with Choleski orthogonalisation, putting money last. The regime is
indicated by the first lag of quarterly GDP growth, such that high-frequency
shifts in regime are possible. As with other VAR-based regime-switching
models (and in contrast to the local projection model we employ), the re-
searcher must decide how to account for the possibility that a shock causes
a shift in regime. In this case, impulse response functions are calculated
as the difference between two stochastic simulations with different initial
17
pushing on a string: us monetary policy in recessions
conditions for output.
Taken together, the results in this paper are difficult to interpret. In
his linear model, a positive shock to the growth rate of M1 reduces output
over a three-year horizon, against the weight of empirical evidence on this
matter. The response of output in a high growth regime is similar to the
linear model - i.e. a positive shock to money growth reduces output, whereas
the response in a low-growth regime is almost nonexistent. The price level
responds more positively in booms than in recessions. So the paper im-
plies that monetary policy is virtually ineffective in a low-growth regime,
and actually contractionary in a high-growth regime, a result that is hard
to reconcile with the standard empirical result that, on average, monetary
policy is expansionary.
Garcia (2002) studies the response of quarterly industrial production
growth to monetary policy in the US from 1955:2 to 1993:1. The business
cycle is identified with a two-state Markov switching regime and estimate
∆yt−µ0−Stµ1 = Σri=1φi (∆yt−i − µ0 − St−iµ1)+βiqXt−i+St−iβipXt−i+t
where Xt is the interest rate in period t and St = 1 if the economy is
in an expansion at time t. The procedure strongly rejects the null2 that
monetary policy, measured either as the simple level of Fed Funds rate or as
Choleski innovations to a standard three-variable VAR, is equally powerful
in both regimes, in favour of the alternative that they are more powerful
in recessions. This method assumes, among other things, that the intrinsic
persistence and other stochastic properties of GDP are the same in booms
and recessions. There is substantial evidence that this assumption does not
hold (see, for example, Acemoglu and Scott (1997) and references therein).
Smets and Peersman (2001) study the response of quarterly industrial
production growth to monetary policy in seven Euro-area countries. First,
they identify the business cycle with a two-state Markov switching regime
with fixed autoregressive coefficients but state-dependent means µi,stfor each
country i at time t in state s
2i.e.the hypothesis that Σri=1βip = 0 for r = 4
18
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∆yi,t − µi,st = φ1
(
∆yi,t−1 − µi,st−1
)
+ φ2
(
∆yi,t−2 − µi,st−2
)
+ i,t
They then separately identify monetary policy shocks with a linear VAR and
use the historical contribution to the time-t policy rate in this VAR as the
measure of the shock. They add the first lag of monetary policy shocks (the
contribution of historical shocks to the current interest rate) to the AR(2)
∆yi,t−µi,st = φ1
(
∆yi,t−1 − µi,st−1
)
+φ2
(
∆yi,t−2 − µi,st−2
)
+βst−1MPt−1+i,t
imposing that the state of the economy is the same across the countries in
the sample. They find that β is more negative in recessions than in booms
- essentially the opposite of our finding.
This method imposes strong assumptions on the dynamics of output.
Firstly, it assumes that past monetary policy shocks can be aggregated
across time in a linear model when the underlying environment may be
nonlinear. Secondly, it assumes that the propagation of a given monetary
shock (the φ coefficients) is the same in different regimes; in other words, all
of the difference in the impact of monetary policy is apparent in the single
β coefficient.
Lo and Piger (2005) estimate the following equation
φ (L) yTt = γ0 (L)xt + γ0 (L)xtSt + t
where yTt is the transitory component of log quarterly industrial production,
and xt is a monetary policy shock identified from a three-variable structural
VAR. St is a two-state Markov-switching process, in which the probabilities
of transition from boom to recession is a function of state variables zt. The
authors find that putting a constant and two lags of an NBER recession date
indicator in zt yields very strong evidence of asymmetry in the response of
output to monetary policy. They calculate impulse response functions to a
monetary policy shock in the four possible combinations of realisations of
the state variable {St, St+1} and find that monetary policy is most powerful
when the economy is in a recession either in period t or t+ 1. Accordingly,
in calculating the impulse response, they do not allow the future state of
19
pushing on a string: us monetary policy in recessions
the economy to change, either exogenously or in response to a monetary
policy shock. Given that the aim of the exercise is to assess the impact of
monetary policy on output - the state variable - this approach is difficult to
defend.
In results, though not in method, our paper is closer to Thoma (1994),
who estimates a non-linear VAR in output and monetary variables, allow-
ing some of the coefficients to depend linearly on the deviation of output
growth from trend. Like us, he finds that monetary shocks (especially con-
tractionary ones) have more powerful effects in expansions than recessions.
Unlike the approach we follow, however, his approach requires the researcher
to make a number of discretionary decisions on the econometric specifica-
tion. In contrast to this and other papers discussed above—and importantly
for understanding the transmission menchanism-our paper stresses the dif-
ference in the response during booms of durables and business investment
on the one hand and non-durables on the other, a dimension glossed over in
this literature.
In summary, the general form of empirical model employed in the studies
above is
(yt − yt) = α (L)
(
yt−1 − yt−1
)
+ βxt + εt
where x is the policy shock shock and y is the set of outcome variables. These
studies typically allow only a proper subset of {α (L) , β, y} to depend on
the state of the cycle. They must also take a stand on how the policy shock
alters the transmission between regimes.
In contrast to the methods used previously, a local projection model
(Jorda` (2005)) has a number of advantages relative to a VAR. First, it does
not impose the dynamic restrictions implicit in a VAR - the true model can
take any form. Secondly, one can economize on parameters and, in some
circumstances, increase the available degrees of freedom. In particular, one
loses observations from the need to use leads as dependent variables. But
the number of variables on the right-hand side need only be enough to
ensure that the shocks εt are exogenous; none are needed to describe the
dynamics of the endogenous variable conditional on the shock. If the VAR
representation involves a large number of variables and lags, the net result
will be an increase in the available degrees of freedom.
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Thirdly - and most importantly for the present study - with a regime-
switching local projection model one does not need to take a stand on how
the economy switches from one regime to another. More specifically, a
regime-switching local projection model takes the form
yt+h = F (zt)
(
βhb xt + γ
′
bzt
)
+ (1− F (zt))
(
βhr xt + γ
′
rzt
)
+ ut
where F (zt) is an indicator of the regime. The coefficents β
j
h measure the
average effect of a shock as a function of the state of the economy when
the shock hits, and therefore encompasses the average effect of the shock on
the future change in the economy’s state. In contrast, when using a regime-
switching VAR model, the impulse response of the VAR implicitly assumes
no change in the state of the economy, an assumption that is difficult to
defend when we are considering shocks with large real effects. Ramey and
Zubairy (2014) finds that this can have an important bearing on the results
when estimating the state-dependence of US fiscal policy. It may explain the
difference between our findings and some of those in the previous literature
on state-dependent monetary policy summarised above.
Overall the theoretical literature has not had much to say about the
state-dependent impact of macroeconomic policy across the cycle. One
notable exception is Vavra (2013), who in recent work argues that reces-
sions are often characterized by high realized volatility, and thus frequent
price changes, which leads to a steep Phillips curve and ineffective mon-
etary policy. He estimates a New Keynesian Phillips Curve on US data
and finds support for this hypothesis. Berger and Vavra (2012) simulate a
model of durables expenditure in the presence of adjustment costs and show
that durables purchases are less sensitive to subsidies when output is low.
They also show that the conditional variance of an ARCH process describing
durables expenditure is higher during booms than in recessions, suggesting
that either aggregate shocks are larger in booms, or that durables expen-
diture is more sensitive to shocks of a given size. They supply additional
evidence against the former possibility, suggesting that durables expenditure
is more sensitive to aggregate shocks - including monetary shocks - during
booms. Our findings support the implication of Berger and Vavra (2012)’s
model that monetary policy interventions are more effective during expan-
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sions and that most of the effect results from the response of durables and
business investment.
2.3 Econometric method
In this section we first set out the specification of the econometric model
used in this study. Then we explain our approach to statistical inference.
Finally we describe our data sources, our state variables, and our identified
policy shocks.
2.3.1 Specification
Our econometric model closely resembles the smooth transition - local pro-
jection model (STLPM) employed in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011)
and Ramey and Zubairy (2014) to analyze fiscal policy. The impulse re-
sponse of variable yt at horizon h ∈ {0, H} in state j ∈ {b, r}3 to a shock εt
is estimated as the coefficient βjh in the following regression
yt+h = τt+
(
αbh + β
b
hεt + γ
b′xt
)
F (zt)+
(
αrh + β
r
hεt + γ
r′xt
)
(1− F (zt))+ut
(2.1)
where τ is a linear time trend, αjh is a constant and xt are controls.
4 F (zt)
is a smooth increasing function of an indicator of the state of the economy
zt. Following Granger and Terasvirta (1994) we employ the logistic function
F (zt) =
exp
(
−θ (zt−c)σz
)
1 + exp
(
−θ (zt−c)σz
) ,
where c is a parameter that controls what proportion of the sample the
economy spends in either state and σz is the standard deviation of the state
variable z. The parameter θ determines how violently the economy switches
from expansion to recession when zt changes.
In this paper, for each variable we estimate theH+1 equations of the IRF
at horizon 0, ...,H as a system of seemingly unrelated regression equations.
By Kruskal’s theorem, this yields the same point estimates of the regression
3b denotes an expansion, r denotes a recession
4In the baseline specification, xt = yt−1
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coefficients as equation-by-equation OLS, because the explanatory variables
are the same in each equation. But it enables us to calculate the distribution
of functions of parameters at different horizons, such as the smoothed IRFs
presented in the figures below.
2.3.2 Inference
We employ two different approaches to conducting inference on our esti-
mated impulse response functions. In order to conduct inference on cumu-
lative impulse responses, moving averages and other functions of response
variables at different horizons, each of these approaches needs to calculate
the correlation of parameter estimates between equations. The first is to
calculate standard errors analytically, allowing for the possibility of serially
correlated residuals within equations and across equations. To capture this
we follow Ramey and Zubairy (2014) and use the Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
method to adjust standard errors for the possibility of correlation in the
residuals across dates t and horizons h. This amounts to estimating the
parameters of the equations separately, as above, and then averaging the
moment conditions across horizons h when calculating Newey-West stan-
dard errors. Following Jorda` (2005), we set the maximum autocorrelation
lag L = h + 1 where h is the maximum horizon of the impulse response
function.
The second approach is to bootstrap the key statistics of interest, namely
the sign of βbh−βrh. This will allow not only for various forms of dependence
among the residuals, but will also account for the fact that we scale the
IRFs with estimated parameters (i.e. the impact effect of a policy shock on
policy rates). Montiel Olea, Stock, and Watson (2012) argue that proper
inference should take account of this, but also that standard large-sample
2SLS statistics can be misleading. To perform the bootstrap we construct
10,000 samples with replacement of size T and calculate the fraction of cases
in which our null hypothesis does not hold. We transform the resulting p-
value into a t-statistic for comparability with the other measures.
Inference on the above families of t-statistics - H + 1 for each response
variable - will generate a ‘multiple testing problem’: if we test n true null
hypotheses at significance level α, we will on average reject αn of them.
Methods such as Holm (1979) exist to deal with this issue. However, in our
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setting there are no strong a priori grounds for specifying at what horizon
the effects of monetary policy shocks depend on the state of the business
cycle, rendering these methods inapplicable in the present study. It turns
out that the t-statistics we present in section 2.4 are strongly correlated at
adjacent horizons, alleviating the practical concern of this problem. But to
deal further with this concern, we calculate and do inference on cumulative
impulse response functions at discrete horizons.
2.3.3 Data
We work predominantly with chain-linked US National Accounts data down-
loaded from the website of the Philadelphia Fed.5 Where our aggregates
do not correspond directly with published data, we construct our own ap-
proximations to the chain-linked aggregates with Tornqvist indices (Whelan
(2000)). We work with log levels of volume indices, and quarterly annualised
log differences of implied deflators.
Our sample period (after the effects of the leads and lags described below
are taken into account) runs from (shocks occurring in) 1969Q1-2002Q4,
with the response variables measured up to five years later. Our sample
runs therefore over the four decades leading up to the collapse of Lehman
brothers, but does not include the ensuing major financial crisis, when the
impact of monetary policy could have been different to a ‘normal’ recession.6
2.3.4 The state variable and the shocks
We define zt as a seven-quarter moving average of real quarterly GDP
growth. Following Ramey and Zubairy (2014), and in contrast to Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2011), our moving average term zt is a lagging rather
than centred moving average, so that future values of response variables do
not appear on the right-hand side of the regression. Higher values of θ mean
that F (zt) spends more time close to the {0, 1} bounds of the process, mov-
ing the model closer to a discrete regime-switching setup. Smaller values of
θ mean that more of the observations are taken to contain some information
about behaviour in both regimes. We follow Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
5We use the latest vintage of the data rather than real-time estimates
6Using end-quarter data - i.e. the shock in the final month of the quarter - yielded
qualitatively similar results to those below.
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(2011) and set θ = 3 to give an intermediate degree of intensity to the regime
switching, and also follow them in defining a recession as the worst 20 per
cent of the periods in our sample, setting c to make this so. The robustness
of our results to each of these choices is investigated below.
Our monetary policy shocks εt are quarterly averages of the monetary
policy shocks identified by Romer and Romer (2004), which we have ex-
tended through 2008 in the manner of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Kueng, and
Silvia (2012). For our baseline estimates of impulse responses, we use the
same regression specification as Romer and Romer (2004). When estimated
over a common sample, we replicate the results exactly; when extending the
sample the regression coefficents and hence the residuals change slightly,
such that our extended series has a correlation of .987 with the original. To
test the robustness of our results, we also run a non-linear, state-dependent
analogue of the regression, thereby allowing for the reaction function of the
Fed to depend on the state of the economy. These are discussed in subection
2.4.3.
The original Romer shocks, the shocks identified with the same method
on a larger sample, and the non-linearly identified shocks are all shown in
Figure 2.1, which also shows our transformed state variable F (zt) at the
baseline parameter values. The figure shows, inter alia, that the monetary
policy shocks associated with the early part of Paul Volcker’s Chairmanship
of the Federal Reserve - the period of greatest variability in the shocks - took
place on the whole at a time of relatively weak economic activity. Section
2.5 examines the robustness of our findings to alternative choices of zt, θ
(the intensity of regime-switching), c (the proportion of the sample we call a
recession), the length and phase-shift of the moving average state variable,
and the identification scheme of the monetary policy shocks.
2.4 Results
In this section of the paper, we first set out our baseline results. We then
explore whether the asymmetry we find is due to a different pattern of shocks
across the business cycle.
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2.4.1 Baseline results
The first four columns of Figure 2.2 show the smoothed impulse responses of
the volume of GDP, the inflation rate of the GDP deflator and the Federal
Funds rate to an identified monetary-policy shock that generates an initial
1 percentage point rise in the Federal Funds Rate - i.e. h is on the x-axis,
βh is on the y-axis7. The first column displays the central estimate of the
impulse response in expansions (dashed lines), recessions (dotted lines) and
a linear model (solid lines, where we restrict the coefficient to be constant
across regimes). The second to fourth columns display central tendencies
and 90% confidence intervals for the linear model, expansions and recessions
respectively. The charts in the fifth column represent our two estimates of
the t-statistic of the null hypothesis that
(
βbh − βrh
)
, with the area between
±1.65 shaded blue. So, for example, if the solid line in the fourth columns
falls below the lower extreme of the blue area at some horizon h we can reject
the null that the IRFs at that horizon are equal in favour of the alternative
that they are more negative in expansions at a 5% significance level. The
IRFs are scaled so that the shock results in a 1 percentage point increase in
the Fed Funds rate in all three regimes.
Figure 2.2 shows that the linear model delivers a familiar picture. Fol-
lowing a contractionary monetary policy shock, the level of output starts
to fall, reaching a minimum of about half a percent below baseline two to
three years after the shock, before beginning to recover. The price level is
initially sticky, but eventually falls by about one per cent, flattening off by
the end of the horizon. The policy rate is persistent but reverts towards and
eventually passes through the conditional mean.
The difference between expansions and recessions is seen most clearly in
the left-hand column. Output responds almost an order of magnitude more
strongly in an expansion than in a recession, with the maximum fall about
1 per cent in an expansion. The price level also falls much more sharply,
by about 3 per cent in an expansion against 0.5 per cent in a recession.
In a recession, the responses of output and prices are mostly statistically
7In this case ‘smoothed’ means three-period centered moving averages of the IRFs,
except at the endpoints of the function. The standard errors of these moving averages
are calculated taking account of the covariance between the estimates at different points
estimated above.
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insignificantly different from zero. In an expansion, the nominal policy rate
falls sharply below the conditional mean about two years after the shock,
perhaps because of the systematic component of policy responding to the
contraction the previous shock has created. The path the policy rate takes
in a recession is on average higher than in an expansion. It is therefore clear
from the figures that the larger response of nominal and real variables in an
expansion is not attributable to a bigger rise in long-term nominal interest
rates.
Table 2.1 cumulates the impulse response functions for GDP and infla-
tion, and shows two alternative estimates of how significant the difference
between them is, as set out above - Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and boot-
strapped significance tests. The cumulative effect of a monetary policy shock
is significantly larger at standard levels, with the precise horizon depending
on how the standard errors are calculated.
Figure 2.3 plots the impulse response of the volumes of three expenditure
aggregates to the same shock as before. In line with the response of aggregate
output, all the volume indices respond much more in an expansion than in a
recession, with the difference already significant one quarter after the shock.
The top row - corresponding to an index of durable household expenditure -
responds roughly an order of magnitude more than nondurable consumption,
both in an expansion and in the linear model. In a recession, the response
of all three kinds of expenditure is insignificant. Figure 2.4 shows that the
response of prices is also larger in an expansion, although the estimated
differences are generally less significant.
Figure 2.5 plots the impulse responses of four other variables often im-
plicated in the transmission of monetary policy shocks. The first two rows
show the response of real government consumption and net tax revenues
(as a share of GDP) respectively. The first row shows that there is weak
evidence that real government consumption responds positively on average
to a tightening of monetary policy. Why this should be so is not clear. One
possibility is that spending is set in nominal terms, such that real spending
increases because the price level falls. However, the behaviour of govern-
ment consumption is response to monetary policy at different points in the
cycle does not support this explanation. In an expansion, when the disin-
flationary effects of policy are at their strongest, there is no evidence that
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real government consumption increases in response to a monetary policy
tightening, whereas there is a significant increase in a recession. It could be
that the larger fall in the price level we see in an expansion raises the real
burden of public debt, such that spending cuts become necessary. Whatever
the reason for this asymmetry, to the extent that increases in government
consumption are expansionary, they will be offsetting the contractionary
impulse provided by monetary policy: government spending seems to have
been ‘working against’ monetary policy during recessions but not during
expansions.
There is weaker evidence for the same on the tax side. The second line of
the figure shows that, after the first few quarters, the tax-GDP ratio seems
to rise more sharply in response to a monetary tightening in an expansion
than in a recession. This again may be due to the stronger response of the
price level in an expansion, and its effect on the government’s intertemporal
budget constraint. To the extent that tax rises are contractionary, this will
reinforce the effect of monetary policy. However, much of the government
debt that is being revalued by the disinflation is held by the US private
sector, who will therefore enjoy a positive wealth shock that will offset much
of the extra taxation needed to service the increase in debt, offsetting the
contractionary effect of tax rises somewhat.
The third row of the table shows a measure of the external finance
premium - the Gilchrist-Zakrajsek bond spread (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2012a)). Monetary policy could be more powerful in a boom if the external
finance premium is more increasing in interest rates in good times than in
bad, such that the rates at which households and firms can borrow move
by more than the policy rate suggests. However, there no evidence of an
effect in this direction and by the end of the sample if anything the opposite
appears to be the case: the external finance premium counteracts the effect
of a monetary shock in an expansion. In a recession, the premium amplifies
the shock. So the response of financing spreads cannot explain why policy is
more powerful in a boom. The difference in the response - which would tend
to generate an opposite result to the one we find for the impact of monetary
policy on expenditure and prices - is not quite significant at standard levels.
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2.4.2 The distribution of shocks in expansions and recessions
One possible explanation for these findings is that the response of the econ-
omy to monetary policy shocks is indeed nonlinear, but is not directly a
function of the state of the economy. Rather, it is possible that policy
shocks of different kinds are more common at certain times, and it is this
that generates the apparent dependence of the IRF on the state of the busi-
ness cycle. If, say, large or positive shocks are proportionally more powerful
than small or negative shocks, and if they are more common in expan-
sions than recessions, then an empirical model like ours that is linear in the
shocks, conditional on the regime, would misleadingly uncover a larger IRF
in expansions than in recessions.
Figure 2.6 and Table 2.2 shows IRFs for the state-independent model
modified such that positive and negative shocks are allowed to have different
effects. We plot
{
β+h , β
−
h
}
, h ∈ {0, H} estimated from the following equation
yt+h = τt+ α
b
h + β
+
h max [0, εt] + β
−
h min [0, εt] + γ
b′xt + ut
and again scale β so that the shock raises the policy rate by 1 percentage
point on impact. The figure shows that positive shocks (i.e. monetary tight-
enings) have a much larger impact on output than negative shocks. This
finding is consistent with those in Cover (1992), Long, Summers, Mankiw,
and Romer (1988) and Angrist et al. (2013). The effects of positive and neg-
ative shocks on inflation are much harder to distinguish, with the difference
between them not significant at standard levels. The bottom row shows that
contractionary shocks are substantially more persistent than expansionary
shocks, hampering any reliable inferences about the effect of a given shift in
the yield curve. However, the finding that contractionary shocks (monetary
tightenings) appear to have a bigger impact on output, but not necessarily
on inflation, than negative shocks is interesting in its own right. 8
If positive shocks to the federal funds rate were more common in expan-
sions than recessions, the results in Figure 2.6 might account for the finding
8We estimated another equation in which the impact of policy was allowed depend
both on the sign of the shock and on the state of the economy when it hit - i.e. to take on
four values at any given horizon. We did not find any consistent statistically significant
evidence of non-linearities by the sign of the shock, but the precision of our estimates was
low given the loss of degrees of freedom inherent in this procedure.
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that policy tends to be more powerful in expansions than recessions. But
no such regime-dependent pattern in the shocks exists. Figure 2.7 shows
estimates of the pdf and the cdf of the shocks overall and depending on the
state of the business cycle.9 There is little difference between the central
tendencies of the distributions of shocks in booms and recessions - positive
shocks do not preponderate in booms.
The main difference between the two regimes, apparent in Figure 2.7, is
that the distribution of shocks is more variable during recessions. If smaller
shocks, which are more common in booms, are proportionally more powerful,
this could also explain our finding of a larger average impact of shocks. To
check this we estimated the following equation
yt+h = τt+ α
b
h + β
s
hεt + β
l
hε
3
t + γ
b′xt + ut
i.e. adding the cubed value of the policy shock as an additional explanatory
variable. If the coefficent βlh on this variable were significantly positive
(negative), this would count as evidence that large shocks of either sign
are more (less) powerful. The left-hand column of Figure 2.8 plots the
functions βlh, h ∈ {1, H} with associated 90% confidence intervals, while the
right-hand column shows t-statistics associated with the null hypothesis that
βlh = 0 for each of the variables. Table 2.3 shows estimates of the cumulative
IRFs and signficance as above. The bottom row shows some evidence that
larger shocks have tended to die out more quickly, which may explain why
their negative effects on output and inflation are attenuated (top and middle
rows). However, the third row of Figure 2.2 shows that a given impulse to
interest rates is more persistent in a recession than in a boom. So it is
unlikely that this is driving our main results.
In summary, positive shocks appear to be more powerful than negative
shocks, but they are not more common in expansions than recessions. Larger
shocks are more common in recessions than expansions, but the effect of a
shock does not clearly depend more or less than proportionally on its size
once the difference in its persistence has been accounted for. This suggests
that differences across regimes in the distribution of the shocks, as opposed
9The linear estimate is the raw Romer shocks smoothed with a normally distributed
kernel. The expansion and recession estimates are generated by weighting the kernel
function with the F (zt) and 1− F (zt) respectively.
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to differences across regimes in the response to a given shock, do not explain
our key findings.
2.4.3 Non-linear Romer regression
The monetary policy shocks used in this paper are identified as the residuals
from an estimated reaction function. If this reaction function is itself state-
dependent, our results may arise from state-dependent measurement error in
the estimated monetary policy shocks, rather than any state dependency in
the true IRFs. To examine this possibility we estimate a smooth transition
analogue of the original Romer regression and use the resulting shocks to
examine the robustness of our results. To be precise, if we write the original
regression as
∆FFRt = βXt + εt (2.2)
where X are the control variables employed by Romer and Romer (2004)
and the estimated residuals εˆt are the identified monetary policy shocks,
then our state-dependent identification scheme is
FFRt = F (zt)β
bXt + (1− F (zt))βrXt + ε˜t (2.3)
and ˆ˜εt are our non-linearly identified shocks. The resulting state-dependent
policy shocks have a 0.902 correlation with the original series and 0.909 with
our extension of it.
Figure 2.9 and Table 2.4 display the results of using the estimated ε˜t
in equation (2.1). The second column in the figure and the solid blue line
in the first column are state-independent IRFs identified using the origi-
nal state-independent Romer regression and as such are identical to those
in Figure 2.2. The third and fourth columns display the state-dependent
IRFs to the shocks identified in equation (2.3). The results are qualitatively
similar to the baseline approach, but somewhat less pronounced and less
well-determined, such that the difference between the GDP IRFs is only
marginally significant at standard levels, and the difference between the
price level responses, while large, has a t-statistic around 1.
Figure 2.10 and Table 2.5 show the baseline IRFs calculated when t
are the structural shocks recovered from a VAR in the log-levels of GDP,
the GDP deflator and the Federal Funds rate, with a Choleski identification
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scheme in which monetary policy is ordered last. The linear IRF is calculated
using shocks from a linear VAR, whereas the non-linear IRFs employ shocks
calculated with a non-linear VAR. The peak response of GDP is significantly
larger in a boom, but the difference is generally nonmonotone. The difference
in the inflation IRFs is similar in size and significance to the baseline case.
In summary, therefore, our baseline results do not seem to be driven
by state-dependent measurement error in the estimated monetary policy
shocks, although allowing for a state-dependent Romer reaction function
widens the standard errors somewhat. Identifying our shocks with a state-
dependent VAR produces similar results.
2.5 Sensitivity analysis
The following section examines the robustness of our findings to alternative
choices of the state variable zt (subsection 2.5.1), the phase shift of the state
variable (subsection 2.5.2), θ (the intensity of regime-switching - subsection
2.5.3) and c (the proportion of the sample we call a recession - subsection
2.5.4). Using our preferred measure of the economic cycle, our results are
qualitatively robust to reasonable alternatives along each of these margins.
2.5.1 The state variable
Our baseline results employ a measure of the economic cycle - a moving
average of GDP growth - to which there are many reasonable alternatives.
This subsection examines the sensitivity of our results to three of them.
Figure 2.11 and Table 2.6 show the response of our headline variables
when Zt is a moving average of a [0, 1] indicator of recession defined as the
proportion of the quarter in which the economy was in recession, as deter-
mined by the NBER. The differences across the cycle between the inflation
responses are similar to our baseline results, and remain statistically signif-
icant at the 10 per cent level. The responses of output are somewhat less
dissimilar across regimes than in the baseline setup.
Figure 2.12 and Table 2.7 contain the results of the same test but define
Zt as an HP-filtered output gap. An HP filter is already essentially a cen-
tered moving average of the level of GDP, so no further filtering or phase
shifting is undertaken. The charts show that there is limited evidence of
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differences between the impulse responses in the different regimes for GDP,
and no such evidence for inflation. Finally, figure 2.13 and Table 2.8 contain
the results of an analogous exercise using a centered moving average of (the
negative of) the unemployment rate. Once again, there is limited evidence
of a bigger effect on output when the unemployment rate is low relative to
when it is high, and no clear picture of any differences in the impact on
inflation.
To sum up, the growth rate of the economy - measured as a moving
average of either GDP growth or the NBER recession indicator - is the most
reliable determinant of the effect of monetary policy shocks on output and
inflation. Measures of the level of resource utilisation - the output gap
and the unemployment rate - are much less informative about the impact of
monetary policy.10
2.5.2 Phase shift of state variable
Figure 2.14 and Table 2.9 show the baseline IRFs calculated when, follow-
ing Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) rather than Ramey and Zubairy
(2014), zt is a centered rather than lagging moving average of output. The
gap between booms and recessions shrinks somewhat and appears earlier in
the case of GDP growth, but the broad picture remains for both output and
inflation, and remains statistically signficant. So our results do not appear
to be an artefact of using a centered moving average to calculate the state
of the economy.
2.5.3 Intensity of regime switching (θ)
Tables 2.10 and 2.11 are analogues of table 2.1 but where we have set θ
equal to 1 and 10 respectively. They show that the qualitative message
of the earlier analysis is unchanged - our results are robust to reasonable
changes in the intensity of regime switching.
10Using leads of the output gap and unemployment works better, given that they essen-
tially cumulate past growth rates, but such leads do not describe the state of the economy
as the shock hits
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2.5.4 Proportion of sample in a recession (c)
Figure 2.15 and Table 2.12 show that the main qualitative conclusions are
robust to increasing to 50 per cent the proportion of the sample judged to be
more in a recession than in a boom. The response of inflation in a recession is
now significantly negative, but still significantly smaller than that in a boom.
Classifying a greater proportion of observations as a recession therefore does
not overturn our main results.
2.6 Concluding remarks
We have found statistically strong evidence that standard measures of US
monetary policy shocks have had more powerful effects on expenditure quan-
tities and prices during economic expansions than during recessions. These
findings are robust to several variations in the empirical model. They do not
appear to be an artefact of different patterns in the shocks themselves, but
rather the outcome of differences in the economic effects of a given shock
at different points in the business cycle. We also find that monetary con-
tractions are much more powerful than expansions. In other words, there
is truth in the quote attributed to John Maynard Keynes that “you can‘t
push on a string” - when the economy is weak, monetary policy can do little
about it.
Standard estimates in the literature that do not allow for state-dependent
impulse responses have masked these differential effects. The findings ques-
tion the common wisdom that cuts in policy rates can stop or mitigate
recessions, calling for the analysis of alternative policy measures during con-
tractions. On the modelling side, the literature has hitherto focused on lin-
ear, state-independent models of monetary policy transmission. In contrast,
these findings call for monetary models that generate a higher sensitivity in
the response of durable goods during expansions, an asymmetry that has
been largely glossed over in the theoretical literature.
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Table 2.1: Cumulative impulse response of GDP and inflation: base-
line specification
Cumulative
impact
on
Horizon Regime Significance level of difference
Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Boostrap
GDP
4 -0.0243 0.0050 0.0182 0.0344
8 -0.0565 -0.0059 0.0652 0.0235
12 -0.0939 -0.0110 0.0312 0.0038
16 -0.0901 -0.0179 0.0894 0.0354
Inflation
4 0.0081 -0.0009 0.1958 0.6474
8 -0.0100 0.0023 0.2480 0.3276
12 -0.0601 0.0034 0.0058 0.0244
16 -0.0973 -0.0070 0.0095 0.0112
This table shows the cumulative impulse response to a monetary
policy shock of GDP and inflation at horizons of 4, 8, 12 and 16
quarters. The third and fourth columns show the values of the cu-
mulative IRFs in the two regimes in units of log differences. The two
right-hand columns show three measures of the p-value of the null
hypothesis that the values of the two IRFs are the same.
Table 2.2: Cumulative impulse response of GDP and inflation: pos-
itive and negative shocks
Cumulative
impact
on
Horizon Regime Significance level of difference
Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Boostrap
GDP
4 -0.0174 0.0101 0.0923 0.0175
8 -0.0668 0.0153 0.0262 0.0020
12 -0.1216 0.0269 0.0031 0.0014
16 -0.1349 0.0288 0.0046 0.0068
Inflation
4 0.0030 0.0098 0.2871 0.2832
8 -0.0157 0.0185 0.1721 0.1244
12 -0.0409 0.0039 0.2368 0.1627
16 -0.0677 -0.0141 0.2612 0.2522
This table shows the cumulative impulse response of a monetary pol-
icy shock on GDP and inflation at horizons of 4, 8, 12 and 16 quar-
ters. The third and fourth columns show the values of the cumulative
IRFs for positive and negative shocks in units of log differences. The
two right-hand columns show three measures of the p-value of the
null hypothesis that the values of the two IRFs are the same.
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Table 2.3: Cumulative impulse response of GDP and inflation: small
and large shocks
Cumulative
impact
on
Horizon Coefficient Significance level of difference
Driscoll-Kraay Boostrap
GDP
4 0.0005 0.2793 0.4177
8 0.0029 0.0649 0.2905
12 0.0086 0.0005 0.2882
16 0.0111 0.0000 0.2581
Inflation
4 -0.0011 0.1547 0.2880
8 -0.0003 0.4463 0.3901
12 0.0023 0.2496 0.2113
16 0.0054 0.0518 0.0158
This table shows the cumulative impulse response to a cubed mon-
etary policy shock ε3t on GDP and inflation, i.e. β
l
h in the equation
yt+h = τt+α
b
h+β
s
hεt+β
l
hε
3
t +γ
b′xt+ut at horizons of 4, 8, 12 and 16
quarters, over and above the linear response to the shock, in units
of log differences. The two right-hand columns show three measures
of the p-value of the null hypothesis that the values of cubed term
is zero.
Table 2.4: Cumulative impulse response of GDP and inflation: non-
linearly identified shocks
Cumulative impact on Horizon Regime Significance level of difference
Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Boostrap
GDP
4 -0.0081 0.0017 0.1932 0.2427
8 -0.0252 -0.0090 0.2310 0.2225
12 -0.0550 -0.0128 0.0537 0.0759
16 -0.0523 -0.0203 0.0952 0.2106
Inflation
4 0.0005 0.0014 0.4627 0.4650
8 -0.0045 -0.0003 0.4211 0.4382
12 -0.0315 -0.0024 0.1106 0.2024
16 -0.0578 -0.0135 0.0668 0.1456
This table shows the cumulative impulse response to a monetary
policy shock of GDP and inflation at horizons of 4, 8, 12 and 16
quarters. The third and fourth columns show the values of the cu-
mulative IRFs in the two regimes in units of log differences. The two
right-hand columns show three measures of the p-value of the null
hypothesis that the values of the two IRFs are the same.
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Table 2.5: Cumulative impulse response of GDP and inflation: VAR
shocks
Cumulative impact on Horizon Regime Significance level of difference
Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Boostrap
GDP
4 -0.0055 -0.0063 0.4677 0.0431
8 -0.0177 -0.0172 0.4907 0.0439
12 -0.0391 -0.0170 0.2112 0.0104
16 -0.0321 -0.0199 0.3333 0.1011
Inflation
4 0.0058 -0.0044 0.0804 0.4658
8 -0.0003 -0.0075 0.2653 0.2912
12 -0.0343 -0.0059 0.0707 0.0372
16 -0.0631 -0.0034 0.0190 0.0050
This table shows the cumulative impulse response to a monetary
policy shock of GDP and inflation at horizons of 4, 8, 12 and 16
quarters. The third and fourth columns show the values of the cu-
mulative IRFs in the two regimes in units of log differences. The two
right-hand columns show three measures of the p-value of the null
hypothesis that the values of the two IRFs are the same.
Table 2.6: Cumulative impulse response of GDP and inflation:
NBER state variable
Cumulative impact on Horizon Regime Significance level of difference
Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Boostrap
GDP
4 -0.0138 0.0053 0.1298 0.0846
8 -0.0359 -0.0045 0.1287 0.0844
12 -0.0575 -0.0122 0.1109 0.0683
16 -0.0568 -0.0193 0.1717 0.1496
Inflation
4 0.0033 0.0051 0.4377 0.4740
8 -0.0106 0.0114 0.1634 0.1845
12 -0.0436 0.0118 0.0141 0.0184
16 -0.0666 -0.0017 0.0186 0.0230
This table shows the cumulative impulse response to a monetary
policy shock of GDP and inflation at horizons of 4, 8, 12 and 16
quarters. The third and fourth columns show the values of the cu-
mulative IRFs in the two regimes in units of log differences. The two
right-hand columns show three measures of the p-value of the null
hypothesis that the values of the two IRFs are the same.
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Table 2.7: Cumulative impulse response of GDP and inflation: HP
filtered output as state variable
Cumulative impact on Horizon Regime Significance level of difference
Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Boostrap
GDP
4 -0.0085 0.0110 0.1433 0.1239
8 -0.0237 0.0016 0.1923 0.1964
12 -0.0363 0.0065 0.1052 0.1571
16 -0.0354 -0.0152 0.2493 0.3636
Inflation
4 -0.0032 0.0127 0.0481 0.2387
8 -0.0145 0.0200 0.0215 0.1334
12 -0.0289 -0.0072 0.2263 0.2816
16 -0.0386 -0.0439 0.4456 0.5155
This table shows the cumulative impulse response to a monetary
policy shock of GDP and inflation at horizons of 4, 8, 12 and 16
quarters. The third and fourth columns show the values of the cu-
mulative IRFs in the two regimes in units of log differences. The two
right-hand columns show three measures of the p-value of the null
hypothesis that the values of the two IRFs are the same.
Table 2.8: Cumulative impulse response of GDP and inflation: un-
employment state variable
Cumulative impact on Horizon Regime Significance level of difference
Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Boostrap
GDP
4 0.0010 0.0287 0.3622 0.3254
8 -0.0112 0.0748 0.2392 0.2725
12 -0.0217 0.0393 0.3092 0.3657
16 -0.0280 0.0673 0.1777 0.3009
Inflation
4 0.0034 0.0311 0.2610 0.3492
8 0.0032 0.0216 0.4048 0.4148
12 -0.0070 -0.0483 0.3207 0.5164
16 -0.0193 -0.1529 0.0382 0.6407
This table shows the cumulative impulse response to a monetary
policy shock of GDP and inflation at horizons of 4, 8, 12 and 16
quarters. The third and fourth columns show the values of the cu-
mulative IRFs in the two regimes in units of log differences. The two
right-hand columns show three measures of the p-value of the null
hypothesis that the values of the two IRFs are the same.
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Table 2.9: Cumulative impulse response of GDP and inflation: phase
shift in state variable
Cumulative impact on Horizon Regime Significance level of difference
Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Boostrap
GDP
4 -0.0060 0.0068 0.1282 0.0988
8 -0.0425 0.0061 0.0562 0.0274
12 -0.0491 -0.0133 0.2610 0.1486
16 -0.0369 -0.0324 0.4709 0.3810
Inflation
4 0.0066 0.0071 0.4901 0.4951
8 0.0009 0.0133 0.3527 0.3611
12 -0.0465 0.0200 0.0265 0.0333
16 -0.0813 0.0134 0.0210 0.0062
This table shows the cumulative impulse response to a monetary
policy shock of GDP and inflation at horizons of 4, 8, 12 and 16
quarters. The third and fourth columns show the values of the cu-
mulative IRFs in the two regimes in units of log differences. The two
right-hand columns show three measures of the p-value of the null
hypothesis that the values of the two IRFs are the same.
Table 2.10: Cumulative impulse response of GDP and inflation: θ =
1
Cumulative impact on Horizon Regime Significance level of difference
Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Boostrap
GDP
4 -0.0513 0.0098 0.0283 0.0664
8 -0.1110 0.0054 0.0441 0.0524
12 -0.1747 0.0055 0.0276 0.0410
16 -0.1528 -0.0060 0.1016 0.0827
Inflation
4 0.0119 -0.0005 0.3058 0.5737
8 -0.0239 0.0056 0.2385 0.3229
12 -0.1265 0.0171 0.0079 0.0556
16 -0.1870 0.0118 0.0130 0.0478
This table shows the cumulative impulse response to a monetary
policy shock of GDP and inflation at horizons of 4, 8, 12 and 16
quarters. The third and fourth columns show the values of the cu-
mulative IRFs in the two regimes in units of log differences. The two
right-hand columns show three measures of the p-value of the null
hypothesis that the values of the two IRFs are the same.
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Table 2.11: Cumulative impulse response of GDP and inflation: θ =
10
Cumulative impact on Horizon Regime Significance level of difference
Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Boostrap
GDP
4 -0.0149 0.0015 0.0522 0.0844
8 -0.0376 -0.0117 0.1460 0.0655
12 -0.0708 -0.0177 0.0503 0.0090
16 -0.0731 -0.0219 0.0854 0.0387
Inflation
4 0.0108 -0.0012 0.0526 0.7608
8 0.0013 -0.0011 0.4303 0.5136
12 -0.0363 -0.0055 0.0433 0.1070
16 -0.0704 -0.0171 0.0239 0.0431
This table shows the cumulative impulse response to a monetary
policy shock of GDP and inflation at horizons of 4, 8, 12 and 16
quarters. The third and fourth columns show the values of the cu-
mulative IRFs in the two regimes in units of log differences. The two
right-hand columns show three measures of the p-value of the null
hypothesis that the values of the two IRFs are the same.
Table 2.12: Cumulative impulse response of GDP and inflation:
c=0.5
Cumulative impact on Horizon Regime Significance level of difference
Expansion Recession Driscoll-Kraay Boostrap
GDP
4 -0.0389 -0.0022 0.0823 0.0890
8 -0.1018 -0.0159 0.0465 0.0654
12 -0.1578 -0.0267 0.0374 0.0428
16 -0.1402 -0.0327 0.1093 0.0969
Inflation
4 -0.0029 0.0041 0.3799 0.4235
8 -0.0357 0.0030 0.1828 0.2473
12 -0.1340 -0.0045 0.0207 0.0406
16 -0.1958 -0.0177 0.0180 0.0363
This table shows the cumulative impulse response to a monetary
policy shock of GDP and inflation at horizons of 4, 8, 12 and 16
quarters. The third and fourth columns show the values of the cu-
mulative IRFs in the two regimes in units of log differences. The two
right-hand columns show three measures of the p-value of the null
hypothesis that the values of the two IRFs are the same.
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Figure 2.1: Monetary policy shocks and the state of the economy
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
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Romer shocks
Extended linear shocks
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Probability of an expansion
The blue line is the series of monetary policy in Romer and Romer
(2004). The green line is constructed in an identical fashion but over
a longer sample. The red line is constructed over the same longer
sample but with a state-dependent regression model. The turquoise
line is the value of the cdf of our state variable F (zt). See main text
for details.
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Figure 2.2: Impulse response of headline variables to a monetary
policy shock
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The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary
policy shock that increases the Federal Funds rate by 1 percentage
point on impact. In the first column, the solid blue line shows the
response in a linear, state-independent model, the green dashed line
shows the response in an expansion, and the red dotted line the
response in a recession. The second column shows a 90 per cent
confidence interval around the state-independent response, the third
column the same interval around the response in an expansion, and
the fourth column the interval around the response in a recession.
The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the
difference between the coefficients in an expansion and a recession is
zero. The black line is calculated assuming spherical disturbances,
the red line using a modified Newey-West method, and the blue line
using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The light
blue shaded area is ±1.65. The first row is the log-level of real GDP,
the second row is the quarterly annualised inflation rate of the GDP
deflator, and the third row is the level of the Federal Funds rate.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse response of expenditure volumes
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The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary
policy shock that increases the Federal Funds rate by 1 percentage
point on impact. In the first column, the solid blue line shows the
response in a linear, state-independent model, the green dashed line
shows the response in an expansion, and the red dotted line the
response in a recession. The second column shows a 90 per cent
confidence interval around the state-independent response, the third
column the same interval around the response in an expansion, and
the fourth column the interval around the response in a recession.
The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the
difference between the coefficients in an expansion and a recession is
zero. The black line is calculated assuming spherical disturbances,
the red line using a modified Newey-West method, and the blue line
using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The light
blue shaded area is ±1.65. The first row is the log-level of an index
of real durables consumption and housing investment, the second
row an index of real consumption of nondurable goods and services,
and the third row an index of real fixed business investment.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse response of expenditure prices
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The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary
policy shock that increases the Federal Funds rate by 1 percentage
point on impact. In the first column, the solid blue line shows the
response in a linear, state-independent model, the green dashed line
shows the response in an expansion, and the red dotted line the
response in a recession. The second column shows a 90 per cent
confidence interval around the state-independent response, the third
column the same interval around the response in an expansion, and
the fourth column the interval around the response in a recession.
The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the
difference between the coefficients in an expansion and a recession is
zero. The black line is calculated assuming spherical disturbances,
the red line using a modified Newey-West method, and the blue line
using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The light
blue shaded area is ±1.65. The first row is the quarterly annualised
inflation rate of an index of durables consumption and housing in-
vestment, the second row the inflation rate of real consumption of
nondurable goods and services, and the third row the inflation rate
of fixed business investment.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse response functions of fiscal and credit variables
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The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary
policy shock that increases the Federal Funds rate by 1 percentage
point on impact. In the first column, the solid blue line shows the
response in a linear, state-independent model, the green dashed line
shows the response in an expansion, and the red dotted line the
response in a recession. The second column shows a 90 per cent
confidence interval around the state-independent response, the third
column the same interval around the response in an expansion, and
the fourth column the interval around the response in a recession.
The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the
difference between the coefficients in an expansion and a recession is
zero. The black line is calculated assuming spherical disturbances,
the red line using a modified Newey-West method, and the blue line
using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The light
blue shaded area is ±1.65. The first row is the log-level of an index
of real government consumption, the second row the level of the net
tax-GDP ratio, the third row the Gilchrist-Zakrajsek bond spread
index, and the fourth row the level of private nonfinancial debt to
GDP.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse response to positive and negative monetary pol-
icy shocks
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The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary
policy shock that increases the Federal Funds rate by 1 percentage
point on impact. In the first column, the solid blue line shows the
response in a linear, state-independent model, the green dashed line
shows the response to a positive shock, and the red dotted line the
response to a negative shock (normalised to have the same sign).
The second column shows a 90 per cent confidence interval around
the state-independent response, the third column the same interval
around the response to a positive shock, and the fourth column the
interval around the response to a negative shock. The fifth column
shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the difference between
the responses to positive and negative shocks is zero. The black line
is calculated assuming spherical disturbances, the red line using a
modified Newey-West method, and the blue line using a bootstrap
approach (see main text for details). The light blue shaded area is
±1.65. The first row is the log-level of real GDP, the second row is
the quarterly annualised inflation rate of the GDP deflator, and the
third row is the level of the Federal Funds rate.
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Figure 2.7: Pdfs and cdfs of the regime-specific shocks
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The top pane shows the pdf of the shocks in the different regimes.
The bottom pane shows the cdf. The green lines show the distribu-
tion during an expansion, the red lines in a recession, and the black
line the average of the two regimes.
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Figure 2.8: Impulse response to cubed monetary policy shocks
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The left hand column shows point estimates and a 90 per cent con-
fidence interval for the impulse response on cubed monetary policy
shocks ε3t , i.e. β
l
h in the equation yt+h = τt + α
b
h + β
s
hεt + β
l
hε
3
t +
γb′xt + ut. The right-hand column shows three estimates of the t-
statistic testing the hypothesis that βlh = 0. The black line is calcu-
lated assuming spherical disturbances, the red line using a modified
Newey-West method, and the blue line using a bootstrap approach
(see main text for details). The light blue shaded area is ±1.65.
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Figure 2.9: Impulse response of headline variables to monetary policy
shocks identified nonlinearly
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The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary
policy shock that increases the Federal Funds rate by 1 percentage
point on impact. In the first column, the solid blue line shows the
response in a linear, state-independent model, the green dashed line
shows the response in an expansion, and the red dotted line the
response in a recession. The second column shows a 90 per cent
confidence interval around the state-independent response, the third
column the same interval around the response in an expansion, and
the fourth column the interval around the response in a recession.
The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the
difference between the coefficients in an expansion and a recession is
zero. The black line is calculated assuming spherical disturbances,
the red line using a modified Newey-West method, and the blue line
using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The light
blue shaded area is ±1.65. The first row is the log-level of real GDP,
the second row is the quarterly annualised inflation rate of the GDP
deflator, and the third row is the level of the Federal Funds rate.
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Figure 2.10: Impulse response of headline variables to monetary pol-
icy shocks identified with a VAR
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The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary
policy shock that increases the Federal Funds rate by 1 percentage
point on impact. In the first column, the solid blue line shows the
response in a linear, state-independent model, the green dashed line
shows the response in an expansion, and the red dotted line the
response in a recession. The second column shows a 90 per cent
confidence interval around the state-independent response, the third
column the same interval around the response in an expansion, and
the fourth column the interval around the response in a recession.
The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the
difference between the coefficients in an expansion and a recession is
zero. The black line is calculated assuming spherical disturbances,
the red line using a modified Newey-West method, and the blue line
using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The light
blue shaded area is ±1.65. The first row is the log-level of real GDP,
the second row is the quarterly annualised inflation rate of the GDP
deflator, and the third row is the level of the Federal Funds rate.
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Figure 2.11: IRFs with NBER recession state variable
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The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary
policy shock that increases the Federal Funds rate by 1 percentage
point on impact. In the first column, the solid blue line shows the
response in a linear, state-independent model, the green dashed line
shows the response in an expansion, and the red dotted line the
response in a recession. The second column shows a 90 per cent
confidence interval around the state-independent response, the third
column the same interval around the response in an expansion, and
the fourth column the interval around the response in a recession.
The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the
difference between the coefficients in an expansion and a recession is
zero. The black line is calculated assuming spherical disturbances,
the red line using a modified Newey-West method, and the blue line
using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The light
blue shaded area is ±1.65. The first row is the log-level of real GDP,
the second row is the quarterly annualised inflation rate of the GDP
deflator, and the third row is the level of the Federal Funds rate.
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Figure 2.12: IRFs with HP-filtered output gap as state variable
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The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary
policy shock that increases the Federal Funds rate by 1 percentage
point on impact. In the first column, the solid blue line shows the
response in a linear, state-independent model, the green dashed line
shows the response in an expansion, and the red dotted line the
response in a recession. The second column shows a 90 per cent
confidence interval around the state-independent response, the third
column the same interval around the response in an expansion, and
the fourth column the interval around the response in a recession.
The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the
difference between the coefficients in an expansion and a recession is
zero. The black line is calculated assuming spherical disturbances,
the red line using a modified Newey-West method, and the blue line
using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The light
blue shaded area is ±1.65. The first row is the log-level of real GDP,
the second row is the quarterly annualised inflation rate of the GDP
deflator, and the third row is the level of the Federal Funds rate.
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Figure 2.13: IRFs with unemployment rate as state variable
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The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary
policy shock that increases the Federal Funds rate by 1 percentage
point on impact. In the first column, the solid blue line shows the
response in a linear, state-independent model, the green dashed line
shows the response in an expansion, and the red dotted line the
response in a recession. The second column shows a 90 per cent
confidence interval around the state-independent response, the third
column the same interval around the response in an expansion, and
the fourth column the interval around the response in a recession.
The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the
difference between the coefficients in an expansion and a recession is
zero. The black line is calculated assuming spherical disturbances,
the red line using a modified Newey-West method, and the blue line
using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The light
blue shaded area is ±1.65. The first row is the log-level of real GDP,
the second row is the quarterly annualised inflation rate of the GDP
deflator, and the third row is the level of the Federal Funds rate.
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Figure 2.14: IRFs with centered state variable
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The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary
policy shock that increases the Federal Funds rate by 1 percentage
point on impact. In the first column, the solid blue line shows the
response in a linear, state-independent model, the green dashed line
shows the response in an expansion, and the red dotted line the
response in a recession. The second column shows a 90 per cent
confidence interval around the state-independent response, the third
column the same interval around the response in an expansion, and
the fourth column the interval around the response in a recession.
The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the
difference between the coefficients in an expansion and a recession is
zero. The black line is calculated assuming spherical disturbances,
the red line using a modified Newey-West method, and the blue line
using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The light
blue shaded area is ±1.65. The first row is the log-level of real GDP,
the second row is the quarterly annualised inflation rate of the GDP
deflator, and the third row is the level of the Federal Funds rate.
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Figure 2.15: Impulse response of headline variables to monetary pol-
icy shock, c = 50
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The first four columns show the impulse response to a monetary
policy shock that increases the Federal Funds rate by 1 percentage
point on impact. In the first column, the solid blue line shows the
response in a linear, state-independent model, the green dashed line
shows the response in an expansion, and the red dotted line the
response in a recession. The second column shows a 90 per cent
confidence interval around the state-independent response, the third
column the same interval around the response in an expansion, and
the fourth column the interval around the response in a recession.
The fifth column shows t-statistics testing the hypothesis that the
difference between the coefficients in an expansion and a recession is
zero. The black line is calculated assuming spherical disturbances,
the red line using a modified Newey-West method, and the blue line
using a bootstrap approach (see main text for details). The light
blue shaded area is ±1.65. The first row is the log-level of real GDP,
the second row is the quarterly annualised inflation rate of the GDP
deflator, and the third row is the level of the Federal Funds rate.
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Chapter 3
Why are real interest
rates so low? Secular
stagnation and the relative
price of investment goods
3.1 Introduction
The financial crisis that began in 2007 pushed central banks in much of the
industrialised world to the zero lower bound on nominal policy rates. Much
ink has been spilled about how this happened, what central banks should
have done when they got there, and how to avoid it happening again. But
real interest rates had been trending down across the industrialised world
for at least twenty years before this, and had already reached historic lows
on the eve of the crisis (Summers (2013), King and Low (2014)). Alongside
this fall in interest rates, much of the industrialised world saw house prices
and household debt rise to historic highs before the crisis. While these series
have subsequently fallen back somewhat, they appear at the time of writing
to have stabilised at elevated levels in relation to GDP and real incomes in
many countries.
There have been many explanations for this fall in industrialised-world
interest rates, among which are three leading candidates. The first is de-
mographics - in particular a rise in the weight of high-saving age-groups as
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baby-boomers enter late middle age. The second is inequality, whereby a rise
in the share of income or wealth accruing to the high-saving rich has raised
aggregate saving. And the third is emerging markets, whereby an excess of
saving in the developing world has pushed down on rich-world interest rates.
Each of these explanations has merit. But what they all have in com-
mon is a rise in domestic or foreign saving as a cause of the fall in interest
rates. They all predict, therefore, a rise in investment in the industrialised
world.1 But in contrast, nominal investment rates have fallen sharply across
the industrialised world over the past thirty years, a fall which again long
predates the recent financial crisis.
This paper fleshes out a new explanation for the falls in real interest rates
and rises in household debt across the industrialised world, complementary
to those which rely on higher saving, but which also explains the fall in
investment rates. The story is based on the widespread fall in the price of
investment goods relative to consumption over the past thirty or so years
documented in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014). I extend their data back
in time for some countries, to show that this fall has not been a feature of
the very long run, but rather began a few years either side of 1980.
In the model, households need to save to provide for retirement. The
corporate sector invests the savings of the household sector in capital goods.
If the price of capital goods falls, a given quantity of savings can buy more
capital goods, raising the return on investment for a given marginal physical
product of capital. But the increase in the volume of capital goods lowers
the marginal product, thereby lowering the return on investment. The net
impact of these two effects depends on the curvature of the production func-
tion.
I parameterise the model with a less-than-unit elasticity of substitution
between labour and capital, in line with most estimates in the literature (see
e.g. Chirinko (2008)). Consistent with the predictions of the model at these
parameter values, I present cross-country evidence showing that nominal
investment rates have fallen further in countries where the relative price of
investment has fallen further.
Depending on parameterisation and the timing convention in the model,
1With the caveat that some demographic models that featuring slowing population
growth may predict falling investment rates
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the dynamics of the transition to this new steady state can involve a tem-
porary rise in interest rates, as households attempt to bring forward the
extra consumption afforded by the fall in the relative price of capital. This
provides a new interpretation of the period of historically high world real
interest rates experienced in the 1980s. More generally, the transitional
dynamics operate for some decades both before and after the change in rel-
ative prices. For example, I find that the fall in the relative price of capital
has been particularly good for the baby boomer generation whose housing
wealth has been revalued by the shock.
But the new steady state is one of lower interest and investment rates
and higher household debt ratios, even after investment goods prices have
stopped falling. Lower interest rates reduce the user cost of housing, boost-
ing housing demand. Housing supply is fixed, so house prices (or at least
land prices) must rise. Houses are bought early in life and largely on credit,
so household debt also increases. Acquiring these debt claims is an alter-
native form of retirement saving, so the capital investment rate falls in the
steady state, as we see in the data. The model’s implications for household
debt and house prices receive qualified support in cross-country econometric
analysis. I extend the model to allow for bequests, and for heterogeneity in
the bequest motive. My core findings are robust to this modification. Fur-
thermore I find that the real interest rate moves in the opposite direction
to wealth inequality, in contrast to Piketty, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal
(2014), but moves in the same direction as consumption inequality.
These findings cast recent debates on macroeconomic imbalances and
household and government indebtedness in a new light, and have important
policy implications. Some prominent policymakers (see, for example, Ingves
(2014)) are seeking to prevent what they see as ‘excessive’ levels of household
debt. But if low rates of interest and investment, accompanied by pressure
for governments and households to become indebted, represent the transition
to a new steady state in which the corporate sector’s demand for household
savings is weak, then attempts by macroprudential or monetary authorities
to prevent this may be futile or counterproductive. I show that preventing
the rise in household debt in response to a fall in capital goods prices makes
interest rates fall further in response to the initial shock.
The mechanism in this paper builds on a long history of related ideas
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in the literature. Summers (2013) recently raised the issue of the pre-crisis
falls in real interest rates and the possibility that they would stay low for
an extended period in the future. But the idea that capitalist economies
could be plagued by chronically low returns on capital, and that this could
result from an overaccumulation, in some sense, of physical capital goes
back at least to Marx (1867) and Hansen (1938). The fall in capital goods
prices in the face of a need for retirement savings creates a form of asset
shortage reminiscent of Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008), which is
satisfied by the endogenous creation of debt claims on the young. The focus
on the fall in the relative price of investment goods builds on the important
contribution of Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), whose data I draw on
for this study. Rey (2014) and Summers (2014) have, among others, linked
secular stagnation to falls in the relative price of capital goods.
Two papers are particularly close, methodologically speaking, to the
present study. Giglio and Severo (2012) examine the effect of a change
in production technology in an OLG model. Like the present study, Eg-
gertsson and Mehrotra (2014) address the issue of secular stagnation in an
OLG model. They show that a tightening of the debt limits facing young
households, reduced population growth and increased income inequality can
reduce the equilibrium real interest rate in such a model, and explore the
consequences for resource utilisation in a sticky price model. They also
show that falling relative capital goods prices can lower the real interest
rate. Relative to that study, this paper gives conditions under which inter-
est rates can remain low even after capital goods prices have stopped falling;
IMF (2014) finds that relative prices have been stable since 2002. Further-
more, this paper derives the implications of lower capital goods prices for
house prices, household debt and wealth inequality. But unlike Eggertsson
and Mehrotra (2014), this paper says nothing about resource utilisation or
nominal variables.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 sets
out the key facts the model aims to explain. Section 3.3 describes the core
economics of the paper in the simplest possible model. Section 3.4 describes
the baseline model. Section 4.6 shows the results of model simulations in
which I vary the relative price of investment and generate movements in
interest rates, investment rates and household debt which are qualitatively
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similar to those presented in section 3.2. Section 3.6 examines the sensitivity
of these findings to parameter values, and extends the model to allow for
bequests. Section 3.7 extends the model to allow for bequests, heterogeneous
agents, intangible capital and open-economy considerations. Section 3.8
adduces some econometric evidence in support of the model. Section 3.9
concludes.
3.2 Motivating facts
This section sets out the key stylised facts that the model aims to connect:
falling real interest rates (subsection 3.2.1); rising household debt (subsec-
tion 3.2.2); and falling capital goods prices and nominal investment rates
(subsection 3.2.3). This section also addresses cross-country movements in
factor shares (subsection 3.2.4) I focus on the widest possible set of industri-
alised countries for each data series, but also, where possible, show data for
a subset consisting of the 11 advanced countries2 for which the EU-KLEMS
database has sufficient data to calculate long time-series of nominal and real
capital-GDP ratios.
3.2.1 Falling real interest rates
Ex-ante real interest rates can now readily be measured in many indus-
trialised countries with reference to the yields on index-linked government
liabilities. However, these securities were not issued before the 1980s, com-
plicating the measurement of ex-ante real interest rates before then. IMF
(2014) presents an attempt to solve this problem by constructing a para-
metric model of inflation expectations and subtracting the result from the
yields on nominal government liabilities.
Figure 3.1 shows the result for the UK and the US. The figure shows
that interest rates have been trending generally downwards for the 30 years
since their recent peak in the early 1980s. The model-based series in IMF
(2014) suggest that US ex ante real rates were close to current levels in the
early 1970s, fell below zero in the middle part of that decade, before rising
sharply in the late 1970s-early 1980s. King and Low (2014) and Laubach
2Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden,
the UK and the US
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and Williams (2003) (updated to 2014) both also show declining real interest
rates from the 1980s to the 2008 crisis.
3.2.2 Rising household debt ratios
Figure 3.2 shows an index of the ratio of household debt to GDP since 1970
for a broad sample of industrialised countries and our restricted sample of
11 countries. The figure shows a rise in the average ratio of around 50pp
since 1970.
3.2.3 Price and quantity of capital investment and stock
Figure 3.3 shows the simple average across OECD countries and across our
restricted sample of the ratio of nominal investment to nominal GDP. The
nominal investment rate has been trending downwards since at least the
mid-1970s. Figure 3.4 shows that the corresponding stock ratio (the current
replacement cost of the capital stock as a proportion of GDP) had also fallen
from nearly 4 times annual GDP around 1980 to nearly 3 times by 2007 for
the 11 countries in the EU-KLEMS database for which data are available.
Figure 3.5 shows the real investment - GDP ratio across the same two
sets of countries since 1970. The series show no strong trend over the whole
sample, although there is weak evidence of an upward trend since the early
1980s. Figure 3.4 shows that the ratio of the real capital stock to real GDP
(both at 1995 prices) has been trending upwards since the 1970s.
These divergent patterns in the nominal and real ratios are of course
a manifestation of a trend fall in the price of investment goods relative to
consumption or GDP, documented in IMF (2014) and Karabarbounis and
Neiman (2014). Figure 3.6 shows four series of the ratio of the investment
deflator to the consumption deflator. The red and blue lines are taken
from the respective countries’ national accounts data. The green line is the
average change across all the countries in the dataset, and the purple line
is the average among our restricted sample in this dataset. All three lines
show that the relative price of investment goods has been falling in recent
decades, with a fall of perhaps 30% since the mid-1970s. The longer series
show that, prior to this fall, there has not been a secular trend in this relative
price.
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3.2.4 Factor shares
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) document a fall in the corporate and
whole-economy labour share since 1975, within a large number of industries
and countries. In the baseline model presented below, there are no pure
profits in the economy and only two factors of production - capital and
labour. In such a world, a falling labour share must imply a rising profit
share, which in turn is equal to the product of the average return on capital
and the capital-output ratio
Π
Y
=
Π
KpK
KpK
Y
(3.1)
Figures 3.1 and 3.4 show that the real interest rate and the nominal
capital-output ratio have typically fallen in industrialised countries over past
thirty years which, according to the simple equation above, would generate
a fall in the labour share. However, there are a number of explanations for
the apparent discrepancy between the trends in the labour share, the real
interest rate and the capital output ratio:
• The capital-output ratio could be somehow mismeasured, perhaps be-
cause of the omission of intangible or nonreproduced factors of pro-
duction, and has in fact not fallen over time.
• The marginal and average returns on capital correspond to the real
interest rate and the average profit rate respectively. There could be
an increasing wedge between them, or an increasing wedge between
the marginal product of capital and the real interest rate in financial
markets, perhaps because of corporate taxes or physical depreciation.
• Corporate profits include a component of ‘pure profit’ as well as remu-
neration for capital investment, corresponding, for example, to pro-
ducer markups over marginal cost. These markups could have risen
over time.
• Relatedly, profits could be remunerating highly-skilled or managerial
labour, e.g. through the granting of share options, such that the labour
share, broadly conceived, has not fall as much as the wage share would
suggest.
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The baseline version of the model incorporates none of these features. Equa-
tion 3.1 holds in the model and therefore, in generating a falling real interest
rate and a falling capital-output ratio, it also produces a rise in the labour
share. Appendix 3.C outlines a variant of the baseline model with three
factors of production which can generate both a rising profit share and a
falling investment rate.
3.3 Real interest rates, capital goods prices and
the curvature of the production function
Other things equal, lower capital goods prices p raise the return on capital
when denominated in consumption goods: a foregone consumption good
buys more capital goods, so for a given marginal product of capital, the
return on investment
r =
1
p
∂Y
∂K
− δ (3.2)
is higher.
But other things will not be equal - the fall in capital goods prices will
mean that a given volume of savings will finance more of them, pushing
down on the marginal product of capital to an extent that depends on the
curvature of the production function. Whether the volume effect outweighs
the price effect depends on the curvature of the production function. And
savings may respond to the resulting change in interest rates in either di-
rection, depending on the properties of the utility function. To crystallise
these issues before I present the baseline model, this section of the paper
analyses the role of the curvature of the production and utility functions in
the simplest possible model with variable capital goods prices.
3.3.1 Simplest possible model
Consider a world populated by an identical series of overlapping genera-
tions, each of which lives for two periods.3 Each generation of households
has a standard isoelastic utility function defined over consumption in each
3Overlapping generations are necessary because the interest rate in an infinite horizon
model would be pinned down by the household discount factor
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generation of life
U (c1, c2) =
c1−θ1
1− θ + β
c1−θ2
1− θ
Households supply one unit of labour at wage rate W in the first period of
life, and can lend money to firms at net interest rate r to provide for their
retirement. So their intertemporal budget constraints are as follows
c2 ≤ (W − c1) (1 + r)
Young households’ saving in the first period of life as a fraction of their wage
income can be shown to be given by 4
s =
W − c1
W
=
β
1
θ (1 + r)
1
θ
−1
1 + β
1
θ (1 + r)
1
θ
−1 (3.3)
This familiar expression shows that the sign of the slope of the savings sched-
ule in {s, r} space depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1θ .
When this substitution elasticity is high (i.e. above unity), a fall in interest
rates causes a fall in savings, as agents substitute away from relatively ex-
pensive retirement consumption. Infinite-horizon households pin the interest
rate down at r = 1β − 1, and are thus equivalent to OLG households with
linear period utility functions. When the elasticity is below unity, retire-
ment saving is akin to a Giffen good: lower interest rates raise the savings
rate out of wages, as the desire to offset the negative effect of lower interest
rates on retirement consumption outweighs the higher price of it. When the
elasticity is exactly one, these two effects cancel and the savings schedule is
vertical.
Turning to the determination of factor prices, firms hire labour and bor-
row funds from young households, buy capital goods (which depreciatate at
rate δ) at relative price p and maximise profits with them.5 Factor prices
{W, r} will therefore be set equal to marginal product in the standard fash-
4See Appendix for derivation.
5We can for now think of a class of final goods firms turning intermediate goods into
consumption goods one-for-one or into capital goods at rate p−1. This will be made more
explicit when describing the full model in section 3.4
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ion
W =
∂Y
∂L
r =
1
p
∂Y
∂K
− δ
In aggregate, the gross savings of the young will equal the replacement
cost of the capital stock
pK = sW
If we assume a CES production function with elasticity of substitution σ
and capital share parameter α we can derive an ‘investment schedule’ that
implicitly maps s into {r, p}6
s =
p1−σ
[
α
(r+δ)
]σ
1− αp1−σ
[
(r+δ)
α
]1−σ (3.4)
Which way does the interest rate schedule slope in {s, r} space? There are
two effects. The effect in the numerator is negative for the standard reasons:
for given capital goods prices, more savings reduces the marginal product
of capital and hence the interest rate. The effect in the denomnator is of
ambigious sign, and comes through the labour share (for a Cobb-Douglas
function σ − 1 = 0 it is absent). For low σ, an increase in r reduces the de-
nominator, raising the quotient. This is because the saving rate is expressed
here as a fraction of wages and when σ < 1, higher interest rates are associ-
ated with a lower labour share. To save enough for a given volume of capital
goods, a lower labour share must mean a higher saving rate. For reasonable
parameter values, the effect on the numerator will dominate, such that the
investment schedule slopes down in {s, r} space.
The derivative of the saving rate with respect to the price of capital goods
p is the same sign as 1 − σ. Consider a fall in the relative price of capital
goods of x percent. Holding the marginal product of capital constant, the
return on investment increases by x percent as each consumption unit of
investment buys x percent more capital goods. But because of the price fall
a given volume of savings can finance x per cent more capital goods, and
6Derived in Appendix 3.A.2
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the marginal product of each will fall by xσ per cent, such that the sign of
the effect is equal to the sign of 1− σ.
Figure 3.7 depicts graphically how the effect of a fall in p is governed by
the effects of the curvature parameters {σ, θ}. The top left panel shows the
effect of a fall in the relative price of investment goods on the investment
schedule for values of σ either side of unity. The top right panel adds an
upward-sloping savings schedule, corresponding to a relatively elastic utility
function. In this case, the rates of interest and of investment/saving will
covary positively, with the sign of the change once again depending on the
sign of dp (1− σ). The cases of a small open economy or of infinite-horizon
households correspond to a horizontal saving schedule - no change in interest
rates and a change in investment rates of the same sign as dp (1− σ). The
bottom-left panel depicts a highly inelastic utility function. In this case,
the changes in the rates of interest and saving are of opposite sign, but the
former is still the same sign as dp (1− σ). Finally, the bottom-right panel
shows an extreme case in which the savings schedule slopes downward but
is shallower than the investment schedule. In this case a fall in the relative
price of capital would lead to a fall in the investment rate and a rise in
interest rates if dp (1− σ) < 1.
3.4 The baseline model
In this section we augment the heuristic model above with an intermediate
period of working life, and with the requirement for households to buy a
house when young. This enables us to analyse the effect of capital goods
prices on house prices and household debt, and how the existence of both
alters the determination of interest rates.
3.4.1 Households
The economy is closed and comprises three overlapping generations of con-
stant and equal size. Each generation has a standard separable CES utility
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function over consumption and ‘housing’7
U(c1, c
′
2, c
′′
3 , h) =
1
1− θ
(
c1−θ1 + β2c
′1−θ
2 + β3c
′′1−θ
3
)
+ φ
h1−γ
1− γ (3.5)
where I denote leads one and two periods hence with primes and double-
primes respectively. In period 1 (young adulthood), the household supplies
η units of labour inelastically (remunerated at wage W ), consumes goods
and buys a house. She can borrow or save a net amount S1 at rate r. In
period 2 (middle age), the household remains in said house, supplies (1− η)
units of labour, and can again borrow or save S
′
2. In period 3 (retirement),
she sells her house and consumes the proceeds plus her accumulated savings.
So each of the three periods is associated with a budget constraint as follows
c1 + hph + S1 = ηW (3.6)
c
′
2 + S
′
2 = (1− η)W + (1 + r)S1 (3.7)
c
′′
3 = (1 + r
′′
)S
′
2 + hph (3.8)
Forming and solving the Lagrangean yields standard consumption Euler
equations thus
c−θ1
(1 + r′)(1 + r′′)
=
β2c
′−θ
2
(1 + r′′)
= β3c
′′−θ
3 (3.9)
We also get a housing demand equation that depends on future house prices
and consumption as you would expect
φh−γ + β3c
′′−θ
3 p
′′
h = c
−θ
1 ph (3.10)
This is intuitive. The LHS is the marginal utility of housing plus the dis-
counted marginal utility of the retirement consumption paid for by the sale
of the house. The RHS is the consumption utility cost of buying a unit of
housing.
7Housing is in fixed supply so might be more usefully thought of as land, or more
generally any non-produced asset that yields utility
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3.4.2 Firms
A measure of perfectly competitive firms produce intermediate goods, com-
bining capital and labour with a CES production technology
Y = A[(1− α)Lσ−1σ + αK σ−1σ ] σσ−1 (3.11)
These intermediates can then either be consumed directly, or transformed
into capital goods at rate p units of intermediate for every one unit of capital.
The relative price of investment goods - the key exogenous parameter in
our model - is therefore p. This means of introducing investment-specific
technological change is isomorphic to that in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and
Krusell (1997).
Wages are set equal to the marginal product of labour
W =
∂Y
∂L
(3.12)
Firms equate the user cost of capital to its marginal product, both denomi-
nated in consumption goods
1 + r
′
=
1
pK
∂Y
′
∂K ′
+
p
′
K
pK
(1− δ) (3.13)
3.4.3 Market clearing
At the end of each period, the net savings of households of young and middle
age are transformed into next period’s capital stock (at this period’s relative
prices), such that the following capital-market clearing condition holds in
stock terms
S1 + S2 = K
′
pK (3.14)
There is a fixed measure H¯ of housing or land for each of the first two
generations to live in, so that in equilibrium
h = H¯ (3.15)
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3.5 Results
In this section of the paper we set out the results of the baseline model.
Subsection 3.5.1 explains how it is parameterised, subsection 3.5.2 how it
is solved, and subsections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4 discuss comparative static and
dynamic results respectively.
3.5.1 Parameterisation
Each of the three periods of adult life lasts twenty years. The discount
factors {β1, β2} and capital share parameter α are set to hit an annualised
steady-state interest rate of 3% and a capital share of one-third respectively.
The depreciation rate δ is set at set at the standard value of .05 in annualised
terms. I set φ to hit a sensible value for the ratios of housing wealth to GDP.
The elasticity in the utility function {θ} is set to unity (log utility).
A fall in pK amounts to an improvement in the overall level of tech-
nology, in the sense that the lower is pK , the larger is the total volume of
consumption and investment goods a given factor endowment can produce.
However, the overall growth rate of TFP has not notably accelerated over
the past several decades. So when considering changes in p, I change A so
as to keep potential GDP unchanged given existing factor endowments. The
fall in capital goods prices in the simulations prompts an accumulation of
capital goods, so potential GDP rises nonetheless.
The production elasticity σ is set to 0.7. As demonstrated below in the
sensitivity analysis of the full model and above in the exposition of its toy
analogue, this parameter is crucial for the behaviour of the model. Chirinko
(2008) discusses a number of approaches for estimating this parameter and
the resulting range of estimates. These are typically based either explicitly
on a firm’s optimisation problem, choosing capital subject to adjustment
costs, or on estimating a relation between investment or capital intensity
and the level or change in the user cost of capital. Chirinko (2008) cites
over thirty estimates, typically based on firm-level panel or aggregate time-
series data. The median of these estimates is 0.6 and the mean 0.5, with
about 15% of the estimates above the critical value of unity. The author
quotes a preferred range of σ = 0.4−0.6, i.e. much further below the critical
value of unity than the baseline assumption used in this paper. Section 3.8
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adds to this evidence of a below-unit elasticity using cross-country panel
data on nominal investment rates and prices.
A noteworthy recent addition to this set of estimates is provided by
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), who compile a large cross-country panel
dataset on the relative price of capital goods and the labour share in the
corporate sector. They write down a standard model in which the produc-
tion side of the economy is very similar to that in the present study, but
in which consumers have infinite horizons and therefore the interest rate
is pinned down by the discount factor. They identify country-specific time
trends in the data with transitions between steady states in their model, and
find using a ‘robust regression’ algorithm that the labour share has fallen
faster on average in countries in which the relative price of capital has fallen
faster.8 This points to a value of σ exceeding unity; the authors central
estimate is around 1.25. The contrasting conclusions in Section 3.8, based
on regressions of the nominal investment rate on the relative price of capital,
employ the same dataset.
3.5.2 Solution method
We first solve for the steady state of the model for a given value of cap-
ital goods prices p. An initial assumption is made about house prices
and the savings of each generation X0 =
{
S01 , S
0
2 , p
0
h
}
, which implies a
certain constellation of factor prices
{
W 0, r0
}
. Household behaviour is
then optimised taking these prices as given, the resulting optimal values
of X∗ = {S∗1 , S∗2 , p∗h} are computed, and the initial guess is updated toward
them - i.e. X1 = λX∗ + (1− λ)X0, where λ ∈ (0, 1) is a gain parameter.
This process is repeated until the solution converges to a fixed point, i.e.
until Xn ≈ Xn−1.
To assess the dynamic effects of a change in p, I consider a simulation
path of sufficient length T that the economy will be at the steady state at the
beginning and end of the simulation, with the exogenous changes to p occur-
ring in the middle. I first calculate the steady state in each period t of the
simulation {Xsst }Tt=1, given the extant values of the exogenous parameters.
I then optimise the behaviour of each generation t, taking the behaviour
8The authors use the rreg command in STATA as a means of downweighting outliers
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of the other generations as given, obtaining X∗t
(
{Xsss }s 6=t
)
∀t. As above,
the initial guess is updated towards this solution until it converges. I verify
that the model converges to the steady state well inside the endpoints of the
simulation.
3.5.3 Comparative statics
The blue lines in figure 3.8 show the the effect of varying the relative price of
capital goods p on the steady state of the model at the baseline parameter
values. In the baseline model, the annualised real interest rate falls by 20
basis points. The nominal investment rate falls about 1 percentage point
in response to the lower relative price of capital (bottom left panel). This
implies a somewhat upward-sloping savings schedule in the model, notwith-
standing the assumption of log utility which, in the simple two-period model
of section 3.3. This is because the fall in interest rates lowers the user cost
of housing for a given house price. House prices must rise to choke off the
resulting increase in demand - by about 10 per cent in the baseline, relative
to GDP. To fund the purchase of more expensive houses, the ratio of the net
debt of young households to GDP increases by about 20 percentage points
(top right panel). Housing is a store of value as well as a consumption good,
so the purchase of a house is an alternative to the purchase of capital goods
as a means to fund retirement consumption; in general equilibrium, part of
the money that would have gone to fund the purchase of capital goods is
instead lent to the young to fund their house purchase, who live off the sale
proceeds in old age.
3.5.4 Dynamic results
What are the dynamic consequences of the experiment considered above?
We analyse the dynamic impact of a 30% fall in the relative price of capital
goods over one model period (20 years). The exercise of mapping into the
data 20-year model time periods, each of which contains a series of sup-
posedly discrete events, is somewhat nuanced. According to the model’s
timing conventions, savings accumulated at the end of period t− 1 become
productive in period t. An important question is which period’s capital
goods prices are used to convert savings into capital goods, and back into
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consumption goods. In the baseline simulation shown here, consumption
foregone in period t− 1 becomes productive capital goods in period t, with
the conversion happening at period t prices. For this reason, the first period
of low capital goods prices - period 10 in the charts - corresponds roughly
to the 1980s and 1990s in the data. Interest rates are measured ex ante -
so the period 10 interest rate is the return on savings made in the 1990s,
paying a return in the 2010s. The interest rates observed at the time of
writing (the mid-2010s) correspond to period 11 of the model. Alternative
timing conventions are possible - for example turning period t − 1 savings
into period t productive capital goods at period t − 1 prices - and are ex-
plored in the sensitivity analysis below. Timing conventions would matter
less in a model with shorter time periods or in periods with more stable
capital goods prices, and of course do not matter at all when analysing the
steady state.
Figure 3.9 shows the results of the baseline dynamic simulation. In
each panel, the blue line shows the relative price of capital goods produced
in the period in question. The top left panel shows the path of the ex-
ante real interest rate. The ex-ante interest rate earned on savings made
at the end of period 9 (before the fall in capital goods prices) rises. This
corresponds to the late 1970s, a period of rising world interest rates. The
middle left panel shows that the saving (or investment) rate falls before
the shock hits, recovers partially, and then resumes its fall. A fall in the
saving rate combined with a rise in the interest rate is indicative of a shift
inwards in the saving schedule. Consistent with this, the top right panel
shows the path of household debt, which begins to rise in advance of the fall
in capital goods prices. Younger generations can look forward to funding
their retirement in part by selling more expensive houses, and thus begin
consuming and dissaving more. The middle-right panel shows that the rise in
housing wealth in relation to GDP takes several generations to be completed.
The bottom right panel shows that the profit share initially rises and
then falls when the shock hits, as the fall in the interest rate outweighs the
rise in the capital-output ratio at the assumed parameter values. How this
feature of the model relates to the evidence is discussed in section 3.3.
Finally, the bottom-right panel shows the response of output and the con-
sumption of each age group. Output initially falls very slightly as capital is
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decumulated, but eventually rises as the fall in capital goods prices affords a
larger real capital stock. GDP rises despite the assumed fall in Hicks-neutral
productivity in the intermediate goods sector, which is calibrated to be suf-
ficient to offset the improvement in technology that the fall in p represents
without any increase in factor endowments. The consumption of the young
generations rises sooner, and by more, than that of older generations, such
that in the steady state the age-consumption profile is flatter. It rises more
because the steady-state interest rate is lower, encouraging households to
consume earlier, and sooner because households who are young on the eve
of the shock anticipate capital gains on their house purchases. This pattern
of capital gains can also be observed in the consumption of the old - the gen-
eration that is old in period 11 (i.e. the baby boomers) consumes more in
retirement than any other retired generation, because it enjoyed the biggest
capital gains on housing, buying them relatively cheaply in the 1960-1970s
and then trading down in the early 21st century.
Overall, the simulation results generate a qualitatively similar pattern in
the real interest rate, housing wealth, the real and nominal capital-output
ratios and the household debt-GDP ratio to those which we have observed
over the past four decades. The shock is particularly beneficial for the baby-
boomer generation. Furthermore, the simulations provide forecasts of what
may happen in years to come. In particular, even if the relative price of
capital has stopped falling, the interest rate may continue to fall somewhat,
as the capital deepening process brought on by the fall in the relative price
of capital runs its course. And future generations of retirees will consume
less than the current one.
3.6 Sensitivity analysis
In this section paper we conduct sensitivity analysis on the main model.
Subsection 3.6.1 varies the availability of household debt. Subsection 3.6.2
varies the key parameters of the model and subsection examines the timing
conventions.
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3.6.1 Housing and debt
The availability of debt and housing as alternative savings vehicles attenu-
ates the fall in interest rates in the model. This is illustrated in figure 3.10,
which considers two alternative regimes for household debt alongside the
baseline model. The green line represents a regime in which household debt
is forbidden (the net savings of the young must be nonnegative, i.e. S1 > 0).
The red represents a simulation in which there is an upper bound on debt
that binds at an intermediate level of p. These constraints attenuate the
rise in house prices (bottom right panel), as young consumers cannot spread
the extra cost of housing over their lives. The fall in the aggregate savings
rate (bottom left panel) is also attenuated, as the debt of the young and
more expensive houses are less readily available as savings vehicles. Higher
savings means more capital and thus lower real interest rates - the top left
panel shows that, without household debt, a fall in capital goods prices gives
rise to a fall in real interest rates of about 60 basis points, i.e. about three
times larger than in the baseline simulation.
Figure 3.11 shows the dynamic effects of a shock to p when household
debt is prohibited. The key difference is that the path of interest rates
is now monotone. Interest rates do not rise ahead of the shock because
young households are not able to borrow to bring forward consumption. The
investment rate follows the same falling-rising pattern but now settles at a
higher rate than before the shock, as household debt is no longer available as
an alternative destination for retirement savings. The bottom-right panel
of the figure shows that it is now the middle-aged rather than the young
whose consumption rises the most. As before, lower interest rates dissuade
retirement saving, but the young cannot respond by dissaving more; only
the middle-aged can respond, by reducing retirement consumption at the
expense of higher consumption in middle age.
3.6.2 Parameterisation
Curvature of the production function
The key parameter in this model is the elasticity of substitution in the pro-
duction function σ between capital and labour. Figure 3.12 shows how the
impact of p on the steady state of the model depends on the elasticity of
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substitution between capital and labour σ. When the production function is
Cobb-Douglas, the relative price of capital has no effect on the interest rate,
house prices, household debt or the investment rate in the steady state. The
heuristic model presented in section 3.3 explains why. The volume of capital
goods bought with a given quantity of consumption goods is inversely pro-
portional to the relative price. With a Cobb-Douglas production function,
the marginal product of capital is inversely proportional to the real capital-
output ratio, so these two effects exactly offset. There are nonetheless some
dynamic effects during the transition to lower relative capital prices (fig-
ure 3.13). In particular, the interest rate rises and then falls, as consumers
attempt to bring forward some of the higher consumption afforded by the
lower capital goods prices.
Figures 3.12 also the effect of the fall in relative capital goods prices on
the steady state of the model when the σ = 1.3, in line with the estimates
in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), and symmetric around the Cobb-
Douglas case with the baseline value of σ = 0.7. Everything now goes in
the opposite direction to the baseline: interest rates and the investment
rate rise, while house prices and the household debt ratio fall. Figure 3.14
shows the dynamics of the transition. The interest rate and investment rate
overshoot their long run value during the transition. The profit share rises
and the household debt ratio falls monotonically.
For all the values of σ considered here, the interest rate falls in the period
after the shock hits, and in this sense the model can account qualitatively
for interest rates being lower now than during the early 1980s. However, the
amount further that the interest rate is expected to fall, and where it will
settle relative to its previous value, depend crucially on σ, and in particular
whether it is bigger or smaller than one. Furthermore, the model can only
account for rising house prices and debt when σ is below one. This result
can be viewed in one of two ways. Either the model is ‘wrong’, or at least
insufficiently general to account for the facts it is trying to explain without
particular values for key parameters. Or it helps to identify a value for σ
that is in line with the range of estimates reported in Chirinko (2008) and
with the econometric evidence presented in section 3.8, but not with the
findings in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014).
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Parameters of the utility function
The curvature parameters in the utility function are important because, as
discussed in section 3.3, there could be no effect on interest rates in a model
with overlapping generations and infinitely elastic utility (and hence savings)
functions. Figure 3.15 shows how the effect of p on the steady state of the
model depends on the the curvature parameter {θ} in the utility function.
In these experiments we recalibrate β to hit the same initial interest rate but
leave fixed the other parameters, in particular the utility function parameters
{γ, φ}. The figure shows that, if the utility function is more inelastic (setting
θ = 1.5), the interest rate falls by less, while house prices and household debt
fall by somewhat more. This is in sharp contrast to the simplified model
presented in section 3.3, which predicts that the interest rate varies by less
when the utility function is more elastic. The reason for the discrepancy is
the addition of housing to the model. If we omit housing from the model
(see figure 3.16), the effect of the curvature of the utility function is in line
with section 3.3: more elastic utility means that the interest varies by less.
3.6.3 Timing conventions in the model
Time periods in this model are 20 years long. Within-period timing con-
ventions may accordingly have an important effect on the dynamics of the
model. In particular, in the baseline simulations above, savings accumu-
lated in period t are assumed to be turned into capital goods at the end of
period t, at period t prices, and yield a physical return in period t+1 before
implicitly being transformed back into intermediate goods at period t + 1
prices. A reasonable alternative would be to assume that savings made in
period t are transformed into capital goods at the beginning of the following
period t+ 1, at the prices extant in that period, and then transformed back
into intermediate goods in the same period at the same prices. There would
then be no price depreciation component in interest rates.
Figure 3.17 shows the dynamic effects of a change in capital goods prices
when the timing convention is altered in this manner. In a steady state
with constant capital goods prices, these timing conventions clearly would
not affect the steady state, so only the dynamic solution is shown. The
most striking difference is in the path of interest rates, which fall in the
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period before the shock, rise above their pre-shock value and then fall again
to their new, lower steady state value. Depending on when one dates the
fall in capital goods prices that took place over this period, this pattern
may rationalise the relatively low world interest rates observed in the early
to mid-1970s. Figure 3.6 shows that the fall in capital goods prices was
relatively steady over the period between the mid-1970s to mid-1990s, such
that either timing assumption is reasonable in a model with 20-year periods.
3.7 Extensions
This section of the paper extends the model in various directions. Subsection
3.7.1 adds a bequest motives to households’ objective functions. Subsection
3.7.2 looks at the inequality that arises between agents when only a subset
have a bequest motive, and how this changes when the relative price of
capital moves. Subsection 3.7.3 extends the model to study the behaviour
of asset prices and the external balance in a small open economy.
3.7.1 Bequests
In the baseline model, households spend all their wealth by the end of their
lives, including their housing wealth. In practice, bequests form a large part
of households’ total resources and a large fraction of GDP is bequeathed in
any one year (Piketty (2011)). Retirees often live in owner-occupied housing
until the end of life (Yang (2009). These features can be introduced into our
framework by adding bequests {b′ , b} respectively given and received to the
utility function and budget constraints as follows9
U(c1, c
′
2, c
′′
3 , h, b) =
1
1− θ
(
c1−θ1 + β2c
′1−θ
2 + β3c
′′1−θ
3
)
+ φ
h1−γ
1− γ + ξ
b
′1−ζ
1− ζ
(3.16)
c1 + hph + S1 = ηW (3.17)
c
′
2 + S
′
2 = (1− η)W + (1 + r)S1 + b (3.18)
c
′′
3 + b
′
= (1 + r
′′
)S
′
2 + hph (3.19)
9These are ‘warm glow’ preferences over bequests. Households still care about the
consumption value of their assets in retirement, because they evaluate their bequests in
consumption rather than utility terms. Adding later generations’ utility directly to the
utility function would collapse the model into an infinite horizon setup.
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Again forming and solving the Lagrangean we get Euler equations thus
c−θ1
(1 + r′)(1 + r′′)
=
β2c
′−θ
2
(1 + r′′)
= β3c
′′−θ
3 = ξb
′−ζ (3.20)
Piketty (2011) finds that bequests in France are around 15% of GDP. With
log utility bequests will be a constant fraction of old-age consumption. Con-
sistent with this, we set ξ = 0.75β3. Figures 3.18 and 3.19 show that, qual-
itatively speaking, the steady state and dynamic solutions of the model are
unaffected by this change, although the change in interest rates is attenu-
ated somewhat. The levels of debt and house prices are nonetheless higher
at any given level of p. Households save for bequests much like they save
for retirement consumption. By the time the middle-aged receive their re-
quests, they themselves are on the cusp of retirement and are therefore no
long debtors. Anticipating bequests in middle age, the young accumulate
more debt and push up house prices.
3.7.2 Heterogeneous agents
In the versions of the model presented above, the only dimension along
which agents are heterogeneous is age. The change in p affects different
generations differently, but there can be no intra-generational inequality. In
reality, inherited wealth is distributed highly unequally across the members
of any given generation. The asset-price consequences of a change in p are
accordingly likely to have consequences for intra-generational inequality. To
study this, we simulate a version of the model in which the population is
divided into two kinds of dynasty - life-cycle households without a bequest
motive, as in the baseline model, and households with a bequest motive. For
illustrative purposes, we set the proportions of each kind to one-half, and
apportion to them equal labour endowments (and thus labour income).
Figure 3.20 sets out the dynamic consequences of a change in p on the
ratio of the consumption of households with a bequest motive to life-cycle
households. In the steady state before the fall in p, households with the be-
quest motive accumulate more wealth (about one-and-a-half times as much)
and consume about 13% more than those without it, even though they have
the same labour income. In the long run, as in the baseline and dynastic
models, the fall in p lowers the real interest rate and raises house prices.
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Consumption inequality falls because lower interest rates reduce the returns
to inherited wealth, and thus the extra consumption that can sustainably be
financed from bequests. But the fall in interest rates revalues non-produced
assets (land) such that the wealth-income ratio rises. Households that do
not receive bequests have only life-cycle saving, which falls somewhat, as
a source of lifetime wealth, so wealth inequality increases. In this model,
therefore, and in contrast to Piketty et al. (2014), r moves in the opposite di-
rection to wealth inequality, but moves in the same direction as consumption
inequality.
The dynamic consequences of the shock to p are non-monotone and vary
a great deal according to date of birth. Households in bequest-giving dy-
nasties who are young on the eve of the shock do especially well, because
they receive a disproportionate slice of the one-off capital gains that accrue
to asset holders.
3.7.3 Open economy
The baseline model in this paper treats the industrialised world as a large,
closed economy, with a view to explaining a global trend. The world is of
course composed of many economies which are open to trade in goods and
financial assets with each other as well as with emerging markets. For any
one of these countries, foreign assets are an important store of value, such
that we might expect the external position of any given economy to depend
on the domestic relative price of its capital goods. The real interest rate
in any given country may accordingly not depend to a great extent on the
relative price of capital goods in that country, even if the interest rate and
the relative price of capital goods are linked at a global level. Furthermore,
testing the implications of the model presented above is hampered by the
fact that, at a global level, we only have one very short time series when time
is denominated in model units, whereas an open-economy version will lend
itself to testing along the cross-country dimension. Last but not least, the
low-frequency behaviour of the current account dynamics is of independent
interest.
To study the open-economy implications of capital goods prices, and to
take our model more readily to the data, we therefore consider a simple
open-economy version of our baseline model. We assume that intermediate
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goods, and financial claims denominated in them, are perfectly tradable
across borders. They are transformed into consumption and investment
goods at home using the domestic technology. This technology can vary
across countries, and hence so can the relative price of capital goods. Each
country takes the world real interest rate as given. Relative to the closed-
economy baseline model set out in section 3.4, all prices and quantities
except the interest rate r acquire country subscripts i, and the only equation
to materially change is the asset-market clearing condition (3.14)
S1i + S2i −K ′ipKi = NFAi (3.21)
where NFAi denotes the net foreign assets of country i.
Figure 3.21 shows the steady-state effect of changing the relative price
pKi of capital goods in country i holding the world interest rate fixed and
starting from a position in which, at pKi = 1, the net foreign asset position
is zero. The experiment can be thought of as describing the behaviour of
a small open economy in which the relative price of capital goods falls by
more than the world average. The blue lines show the impact in a closed
economy (i.e. the baseline simulation), and the green lines show the small
open economy. The top left panel reminds us that, by construction, interest
rates do not change. The fall in capital goods prices leads the corporate
sector to demand less in the way of investable funds, as we see by the fall
in the nominal investment rate (top right panel). Middle-aged households’
savings go overseas rather than to young households when the economy is
open, such that net foreign assets rise from zero to about 60% of GDP
(bottom right), while the household debt ratio is essentially unchanged.
House prices relative to incomes (bottom left panel) rise nonetheless, albeit
by about 10% rather than the 30% we see in the closed-economy case. This
is because the fall in investment and the rise in net foreign assets afford a
rise in the consumption-GDP ratio, and consumption and housing demand
are positively related.
Figure 3.22 shows the dynamic behaviour of a small open economy when
faced with a 30% fall in the relative price of capital over one period as above,
but where world (and hence domestic) real interest rates are fixed. The blue
line (read against the left-hand axes) show the relative price of capital, and
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the green lines show the behaviour of the closed-economy baseline model
for ease of comparison. The top left panel shows that, by assumption, the
interest rate in the small open economy is unchanged. The two most striking
results are in the top and bottom right panels. House prices rise ahead of the
fall in capital goods prices (middle panel), in anticipation of higher housing
demand after the shock. This raises household debt as young households
seek to smooth consumption in the face of higher house prices. However,
once capital goods prices fall, output and wages rise sharply, such that the
ratio of house prices to wages falls and young households need less debt. Net
foreign assets rise sharply around the shock as the interest rate that would
prevail in a closed economy falls below the world interest rate: the fall in
domestic capital goods prices makes available savings that can fund foreign
investments.
3.8 Econometric evidence
This section of the paper confronts the predictions of the model with econo-
metric evidence. Subsection 3.8.1 details evidence on the elasticity of substi-
tution between capital and labour σ. Subsection 3.8.2 looks at the model’s
predictions for house prices, debt and the external balance.
3.8.1 Evidence on the elasticity of substitution between cap-
ital and labour
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) present a model in which, like the model
above, the relationship between the labour share and relative price of in-
vestment goods depends on the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labour
sLj
1− sLj ˆsLj = γ + (σ − 1) ξˆj + uj
where sLj is the labour share in country j, ξj is the relative price of invest-
ment, and hats denote low-frequency, country-specific time trends. They
regress the time trend in the labour share on the time trend in the relative
price of investment goods, obtain a coefficient averaging 0.28 across datasets
and and infer that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour
is 1.28.
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Their model also implies an analogous relationship between the nominal
investment rate INY and the relative price of capital
10
ÎN
Y j
= γ˜ + (1− σ) ξˆj + u˜j
Similarly, the baseline model presented in this paper predicts that, when the
supply of funds is perfectly interest-elastic, as in the small open economy case
in section 3.7.3 or a model with infinite-horizon consumers, the investment
rate and the price of investment are related as follows in the steady state
p̂I
Y
= c+ (1− σ) pˆ
These equations motivate regressing the nominal investment rate on the
relative price of investment goods across countries as a way of quantifying
the crucial parameter σ: if the elasticity is greater than one, we would expect
a negative relationship between the relative price of capital and the nominal
investment rate as the quantity falls (rises) proportionally more than the
price falls (rises). We employ the dataset in Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2014) to this end.
Table 3.1 sets out the results, showing the central estimate for the co-
efficient on the relative price of capital, along with its standard deviation
and implied confidence intervals for σ. Results are shown for three different
estimators - robust regression (the estimator used by Karabarbounis and
Neiman) and OLS, both on country-specific time trends, and panel fixed
effects, on country-year observations - and for two different sources for the
relative price of investment (Penn World Tables and the World Bank). In
all cases, following Karabarbounis and Neiman, the sample is restricted to
contain only countries with 15 or more years of observations, and contains
the corporate investment rate where it is available, and its whole-economy
analogue where it isn’t. The results are clearly sensitive to the choice of
estimator and sample. Using Karabarbounis and Neiman’s preferred robust
regression methodology, the central estimates of σ are 0.2 and 0.3, depend-
ing on the source data for relative prices. None of the confidence intervals
for σ contain 1. So on the face of it, these results do not corroborate the
10See Appendix 3.B for derivation
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greater-than-unit elasticity presented in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014),
instead leaning toward a less-than-unit elasticity in line with most estimates
in the literature (Chirinko (2008)). Nominal investment rates are typically
increasing in the relative price of capital, suggesting as a model with a less-
than-unit elasticity of substitution.11
3.8.2 Testing the model’s predictions on house prices, house-
hold debt and net foreign assets
The baseline closed-economy model predicts that countries with relatively
low capital-goods prices will have low steady-state interest rates. In the
open-economy version, these lower shadow real rates translate into positive
net foreign asset positions. And in a state state with growth in nominal
GDP, these more positive external positions would necessitate more positive
current account balances. Furthermore, around the time of the transition,
the bigger the fall in capital goods prices, the more positive the current
account balance. The model therefore predicts a negative relation between
capital goods prices and the current account, both in the steady state and
during the transition.
The closed-economy model also predicts a negative steady-state rela-
tionship between capital goods prices and household debt. There is no such
long-run relationship between debt and relative prices - taking world interest
rates as given - in the open economy model. Finally, both models predict a
negative relationship between relative prices and real house prices.
Given the rising, but on average intermediate, degree of de facto capital-
account openness in the world economy over the past forty years, it is not
clear a priori whether the open- or closed-economy versions of the model
will turn out to be better approximations to the real world.
With these caveats in mind, we can take the model to the data in a
manner analogous to the previous subsection, regressing the household debt-
GDP ratio, real house prices and the current account-GDP ratio on the level
of the relative price of capital. We use the same three estimators used in the
previous subsection: panel fixed effects on annual country-year observations;
OLS on country-specific time trends in relative capital goods prices and the
11Appendix 3.C sets out a model to recognise the seemingly conflicting results obtained
from estimating σ from the labour share and the nominal investment rate.
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current account, the household debt-GDP ratio, and real house prices; and
robust regression on the same.12
Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 set out the results. Table 3.2 shows that, for
panel fixed effects and robust regression on time trends, we find a large
and significant negative relationship between the relative price of capital
goods and household debt. This is in line with the prediction of the closed-
economy version of the model: lower capital goods prices reduce interest
rates, stimulating household borrowing. For OLS on time trends, we find
a positive but insignificant effect. Table 3.3 displays a similar pattern -
large negative and significant coefficients when using panel fixed effects;
negative coefficients when using robust regression, but which are significant
for only one of the measures of relative prices; and inconclusive results from
OLS. Finally, table 3.4 shows the results for the current account. Here
the results for cross-country trends are inconclusive, but panel fixed-effects
deliver a significant negative coefficient, in line with the predictions of the
open-economy model.
Overall, cross-country econometric analysis provides qualified support
for the assumptions in and predictions of the model. There is strong evidence
that nominal investment rates are increasing in the relative price of capital
p, and thus that the key elasticity parameter σ is below 1. There is some
evidence that household debt and house prices are both negatively related to
p, consistent with the predictions of the closed-economy model. And there is
weak evidence that the current account is negatively related to p, consistent
with the open economy model. But taken together, the economies in our
sample appear to have behaved more like financially closed economies on
average over the period in question.
3.9 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of ‘secular stagnation’ - persistently low real
interest rates - driven by the interaction of life-cycle savings motives and an
improvement in the technology for producing investment goods. The model
is complementary to other explanations for low real interest rates that rely on
12At any point in time, the behaviour of the current account in country i will depend
on the path of capital goods prices in country i relative to other countries. So in the panel
regression of current account, we first condition p on time and country fixed effects
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demographics, emerging markets and inequality. Using standard parameter
values and the observed path for capital goods prices over the past few
decades, it is able to reproduce part of the rising-falling pattern in real
interest rates, the falling ratios of nominal investment and capital to GDP,
and the rise in household debt observed across the industrialised world.
The dynamic simulations predict that the real interest rate will stay low,
even if the relative price of capital goods has stopped falling. The model
suggests that limiting the accumulation of household debt would have made
the fall in interest rates larger. And it suggests that the rise in the wealth-
income ratio the shock has produced may have increased inherited wealth
inequality, even though interest rates have fallen.
The model has important normative and positive implications. First, it
and the accompanying econometric results provide additional evidence on a
below-unit elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. Secondly,
it stresses the point that capital goods are simultaneously a social savings
technology, the means of production, and a produced asset in themselves.
So changes in the way that capital goods are produced will have implications
for other stores of value, such as housing, land, public debt, and any ‘bubbly’
asset. And thirdly, it suggests that real interest rates may remain low, or
have further to fall, even if the relative price of capital goods has stopped
falling. Fiscal and monetary rules that are calibrated implicitly on the real
interest rate may need to be revised as a result.
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3.10 Tables and charts
Table 3.1: Estimates of the elasticity of substitution σ
Dataset Panel Time trends Panel Time trends
Estimator FE OLS Robust FE OLS Robust
RHS source PWT WDI
Log(p) 0.491*** 1.121*** 0.776*** 0.290*** 0.999*** 0.695***
[0.04] [0.21] [0.17] [0.04] [0.25] [0.16]
σˆ 0.509 -0.121 0.224 0.71 0.001 0.305
σˆH 0.589 0.299 0.564 0.79 0.501 0.625
σˆL 0.429 -0.541 -0.116 0.63 -0.499 -0.015
N 1632 54 54 1643 52 52
no. of countries 99 100
Table 3.2: Regression of household debt on relative price of capital
Left-hand side variable Household debt/GDP
Dataset Panel Time trends Panel Time trends
Estimator FE OLS Robust FE OLS Robust
RHS source PWT WDI
log(p) -0.993*** 0.702 -0.779*** -1.179*** 0.571 -0.888***
[0.05] [0.65] [0.25] [0.07] [0.72] [0.30]
N 535 18 18 551 18 18
no. of countries 21 21
Table 3.3: Regression of real house prices on relative price of capital
Left-hand side variable Real house prices
Dataset Panel Time trends Panel Time trends
Estimator FE OLS Robust FE OLS Robust
RHS source PWT WDI
log(p) -1.082*** 0.121 -0.672 -0.976*** -0.277 -1.520**
[0.10] [0.89] [0.79] [0.12] [0.91] [0.65]
N 535 18 18 551 18 18
no. of countries 21 21
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Table 3.4: Regression of current account on relative price of capital
Left-hand side variable Current account/GDP
Dataset Panel Time trends Panel Time trends
Estimator FE OLS Robust FE OLS Robust
RHS source PWT WDI
log(p) -0.055*** 0.006 0.020 -0.025** 0.025 0.028
[0.01] [0.05] [0.05] [0.01] [0.05] [0.05]
N 1004 35 35 992 34 34
no. of countries 50 51
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Figure 3.1: 10-year real interest rates
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This figure shows estimates of ex-ante 10-year real interest rates
for the US and UK, calculated as the difference between nominal
government bond yields and model-based estimates of inflation ex-
pectations taken from Figure 3.2 of IMF (2014).
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Figure 3.2: HH debt-GDP ratio, % of GDP
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This figure shows the change in the ratio of household debt to GDP
since 1970 for a broad sample of industrialised countries and a re-
stricted sample of 11 countries (Australia, Austria, Denmark, Fin-
land, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the
US). The source for household debt is the BIS, and the source for
GDP is OECD StatBase. The chart is constructed from an unbal-
anced panel of data by running a fixed-effects panel regression of the
household debt ratio on year dummies, then adding the dummy for
each year to the intercept of the equation. This allows other coun-
tries to affect the change in the ratio in years after they have been
added to the sample.
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Figure 3.3: Nominal investment-GDP ratios
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This figure shows a simple average across 24 OECD countries and
a restricted sample of 11 countries (Australia, Austria, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and
the US) of the ratio of nominal gross capital formation to nominal
GDP. The source is OECD Statbase.
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Figure 3.4: Nominal and real capital stock-GDP ratio
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This figure shows the average nominal and real capital-output ratios
for Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US. The source is the ’All
capital input files’ file from the November 2009 release of the EU-
KLEMS database. The nominal capital stock was computed for
each country as the product of the real capital stock at 1995 prices
and the gross fixed capital formation price index rebased to 1995,
and then divided by nominal GVA taken from EU-KLEMS to give
the nominal capital output ratio. Country-year observations were
regressed on country and year dummies, and average index in year t
was obtained as the sum of the intercept and the dummy for year t.
The real capital-output ratio was constructed analogously, then by
rebasing the average ratio of the real capital stock and real GDP to
the 2005 nominal ratio.
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Figure 3.5: Real investment-GVA ratio, 11 industrialised countries,
2007=1
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This figure shows a simple average across 24 OECD countries and
a restricted sample of 11 countries (Australia, Austria, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and
the US) of the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP, both at
constant prices. The source is OECD Statbase.
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Figure 3.6: Price of investment relative to consumption
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This figure shows four series of the relative price of investment to
consumption. The red line is the ratio of the deflators of gross cap-
ital formation and private consumption in the UK, taken from the
Bank of England’s internal long-run database. The blue line is the
analogous ratio for the US, taken from the FRED database. The
green line is constructed from an unbalanced panel of data by run-
ning a fixed-effects panel regression on the data for all countries in
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), then adding the dummy for each
year to the intercept of the equation. The purple line is constructed
in the same way for Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US.
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Figure 3.7: Simple savings-investment diagram
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Figure 3.8: Steady state, baseline setup
0.7 0.8 0.9 1
2.75
2.8
2.85
2.9
2.95
3
Relative price of capital
An
nu
al
is
ed
 in
te
re
st
 ra
te
0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Relative price of capital
N
et
 d
eb
t o
f y
ou
ng
/a
nn
ua
l G
DP
0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
Relative price of capital
N
om
in
al
 in
ve
st
m
en
t−
G
DP
0.7 0.8 0.9 1
2.8
2.9
3
3.1
3.2
Relative price of capital
H
ou
si
ng
 w
ea
lth
−a
nn
ua
l G
DP
95
why are real interest rates so low?
Figure 3.9: Dynamic solution, baseline setup
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Figure 3.10: Steady state, varying availability of household debt
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Figure 3.11: Dynamic solution, no household debt
0 5 10 15 20
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Time (in 20−year generations)
0 5 10 15 20
Time (in 20−year generations)
0 5 10 15 20
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Time (in 20−year generations)
R
el
at
iv
e 
pr
ice
 o
f c
ap
ita
l g
oo
ds
0 5 10 15 20
Time (in 20−year generations)
0 5 10 15 20
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Time (in 20−year generations)
0 5 10 15 20
Time (in 20−year generations)
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
An
nu
al
is
ed
 e
x−
an
te
 in
te
re
st
 ra
te
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
N
et
 d
eb
t o
f y
ou
ng
/a
nn
ua
l G
DP
0.14
0.145
0.15
0.155
0.16
N
om
in
al
 in
ve
st
m
en
t−
G
DP
2.8
2.9
3
3.1
3.2
H
ou
si
ng
 w
ea
lth
−a
nn
ua
l G
DP
0.25
0.3
0.35
Pr
of
it 
sh
ar
e 
in
 G
DP
0.5
1
1.5
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
in
de
x
 
 
C Young
C Middle
C Old
Output
98
why are real interest rates so low?
Figure 3.12: Steady state, varying curvature of the production func-
tion
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Figure 3.13: Dynamic solution, Cobb-Douglas production function
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Figure 3.14: Dynamic solution, highly elastic production function
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Figure 3.15: Steady state, varying curvature of the utility function
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Figure 3.16: Steady state, no housing, curvature of the utility func-
tion
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Figure 3.17: Dynamic solution, alternative timing convention
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Figure 3.18: Steady state, bequests and heterogeneous agents
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Figure 3.19: Dynamic solution with bequests
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Figure 3.20: Inequality within generations
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Figure 3.21: Steady state, small open economy
0.7 0.8 0.9 1
2.7
2.8
2.9
3
3.1
Relative price of capital
An
nu
al
is
ed
 in
te
re
st
 ra
te
0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Relative price of capital
N
et
 d
eb
t o
f y
ou
ng
/a
nn
ua
l G
DP
0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
Relative price of capital
N
om
in
al
 in
ve
st
m
en
t−
G
DP
0.7 0.8 0.9 1
2.8
2.9
3
3.1
3.2
Relative price of capital
H
ou
si
ng
 w
ea
lth
−a
nn
ua
l G
DP
0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Relative price of capital
Ca
pi
ta
l s
ha
re
 
 
Baseline
Open economy
0.7 0.8 0.9 1
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Relative price of capital
N
et
 fo
re
ig
n 
as
se
ts
106
why are real interest rates so low?
Figure 3.22: Dynamic solution, small open economy
0 5 10 15 20
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Time (in 20−year generations)
0.024
0.026
0.028
0.03
0.032
0.034
0.036
0.038
0.04
An
nu
al
is
ed
 e
x−
an
te
 in
te
re
st
 ra
te
0 5 10 15 20
Time (in 20−year generations)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
N
et
 d
eb
t o
f y
ou
ng
/a
nn
ua
l G
DP
0 5 10 15 20
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Time (in 20−year generations)
R
el
at
iv
e 
pr
ice
 o
f c
ap
ita
l g
oo
ds
0.13
0.135
0.14
0.145
0.15
N
om
in
al
 in
ve
st
m
en
t−
G
DP
0 5 10 15 20
Time (in 20−year generations)
2.8
2.9
3
3.1
3.2
H
ou
si
ng
 w
ea
lth
−a
nn
ua
l G
DP
0 5 10 15 20
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Time (in 20−year generations)
0.25
0.3
0.35
Pr
of
it 
sh
ar
e 
in
 G
DP
0 5 10 15 20
Time (in 20−year generations)
−1
0
1
N
et
 fo
re
ig
n 
as
se
ts
107
why are real interest rates so low?
Figure 3.23: Region of parameter space in which labour share and
investment are both increasing in p
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The shaded area shows the region of the parameter space of the
three-factor production function set out in Appendix 3.C in which
the labour share and the nominal investment rate are both increasing
in the relative price of capital
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3.A Derivations
3.A.1 Saving
Here we derive the savings schedule for the simple two period model in
Section 3.3
c−θ1 =β (1 + r) c
−θ
2
c2 = [β (1 + r)]
1
θ c1
S = W − c1 = c2
(1 + r)
=W
β
1
θ (1 + r)
1
θ
−1
1 + β
1
θ (1 + r)
1
θ
−1
3.A.2 Investment schedule in {s, r} space
Here we derive the investment schedule for the simple two-period model in
Section 3.3. From the CES production function we have
r + δ =
1
p
∂Y
∂K
=
1
p
α
(
Y
K
) 1
σ
(r + δ) p
α
=
(
K
Y
)− 1
σ
K
Y
=
[
α
p (r + δ)
]σ
From CRS and Euler’s theorem we have
W +K
∂Y
∂K
=Y
W
Y
=1− K
Y
∂Y
∂K
=1− α
(
K
Y
)σ−1
σ
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Now we can rewrite the saving rate as
s =
S
W
=
(
pK
Y
)
(
W
Y
)
=
p1−σ
[
α
(r+δ)
]σ
1− αp1−σ
[
(r+δ)
α
]1−σ
So the derivative of the saving rate with respect to the price of capital goods
p is the same sign as 1− σ.
Which way does the interest rate schedule slope? There are two effects.
The effect in the numerator is negative for the standard reasons: for given
capital goods prices, more savings reduces the marginal product of capital
and hence the interest rate. The effect in the denomnator is of ambigious
sign, and comes through the labour share (for a Cobb-Douglas function
σ−1 = 0 it is absent). For low σ, an increase in r reduces the denominator,
raising the quotient. This is because we are expressing the saving rate as a
fraction of wages and when σ < 1, higher interest rates are associated with
a lower labour share. To save enough for a given volume of capital goods, a
lower labour share must mean a higher saving rate.
For reasonable parameter values, the effect on the numerator will domi-
nate, such that the investment schedule slopes down in {s, r} space. To see
110
why are real interest rates so low?
this, differentiate the schedule with respect to r
ds
dr
=
−σp1−σασ (r + δ)−σ−1
1− αp1−σ
[
(r+δ)
α
]1−σ
−
p1−σ
[
α
(r+δ)
]σ
(
1− αp1−σ
[
(r+δ)
α
]1−σ)2 (−αp1−σασ−1 (1− σ) (r + δ)−σ)
=
−σ
r + δ
s+ s
αp1−σασ−1 (1− σ) (r + δ)−σ
1− αp1−σ
[
(r+δ)
α
]1−σ
=
−σ
r + δ
s+ (1− σ) s2
=s
(
(1− σ) s− σ
r + δ
)
3.B Estimating σ from the nominal investment share
in the Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) model
The Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) model decomposes income into the
capital share sK , the labour share sL and markups µ
µ (sK + sL) = 1
Taking logs and then the derivative with respect to time gives
0 =
d
dt
log (µ (sK + sL)) =µˆ+
1
sK + sL
[
dsK
dt
+
dsL
dt
]
=µˆ+ µsK sˆK + (1− µsK) sˆL
Following Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), we set µ = 1, µˆ = 0 and get
sK sˆK + sLsˆL = 0
and therefore we can rewrite the left-hand side of their equation (19) as
follows
sL
1− sL sˆL =
sL
1− sL
−sK sˆK
sL
= −sˆK sK
1− sL = −sˆK
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Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) write the capital share as
sK =
RK
Y
=
1
µ
FK
K
Y
=
αKA
σ−1
σ
K
µ
Y
K
1
σ K
Y
=
αKA
σ−1
σ
K
µ
K
Y
σ−1
σ
If we assume away changes in technology, capital shares and markups we
have
sˆK =
σ − 1
σ
(̂
K
Y
)
In the steady state, the nominal investment rate is proportional to the nom-
inal capital-output ratio
IN
Y
=
pδK
Y
so that
K
Y
=
IN
Y
1
pδ
If we assume away changes in depreciation rates we have
sˆK =
σ − 1
σ
K̂
Y
=
σ − 1
σ
(
ÎN
Y
− pˆ
)
Combining these results with the estimating equation (19)
sLj
1− sLj ˆsLj = γ + (σ − 1) pˆ+ uj
we have
sLj
1− sLj ˆsLj =− sˆK =
1− σ
σ
(
ÎN
Y
− pˆ
)
ÎN
Y
− pˆ =γ˜ + σ
1− σ (σ − 1) pˆ+ u˜j
ÎN
Y
=γ˜ + (1− σ) pˆ+ u˜j
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In other words, if the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour
σ is greater than unity, then a fall in the relative price of capital should
lead to a rise in the ratio of nominal investment to GDP, as the volume of
investment rises by a greater proportion than the fall in its price.
3.C Three-factor model
This appendix sketches out an alternative production function for interme-
diate goods which breaks the negative relation between the labour share and
the investment rate and can, at certain parameter values, deliver a labour
share and a nominal investment rate which are both increasing in the rela-
tive price of capital. It then illustrates the region of the parameter space at
which this is so.
3.C.1 Modified production function
Consider a production function defined over three factors - capital K, un-
skilled labour L and entrepreneurial labour M , which is paid in profits. K
and L are aggregated first into an intermediate X, then combined with M
as follows
X =G (K,L)
=[(1− α)Lσ−1σ + αK σ−1σ ] σσ−1
Y =F (X,M)
=[µM
θ−1
θ + (1− µ)X θ−1θ ] θθ−1
Y =F (G (K,L) ,M)
=F˜ (K,L,M)
=
[
µM
θ−1
θ + (1− µ)
[[
(1− α)Lσ−1σ + αK σ−1σ
] σ
σ−1
] θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
3.C.2 Labour share and investment rate
The nominal investment rate is proportional to the capital share at fixed
interest rates, because the marginal product of capital is inversely propor-
tional to the price of capital. So a shift inward in the investment schedule
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is equivalent to a fall in the capital share
IN
Y
=
δPK
Y
=
δ
r + δ
MPK
K
Y
The factor share for factor Z is
ΩZ =
∂Y
∂Z
Z
Y
Denoting logs with lower case we have
ωK =A+ log
((
Y
X
) 1
θ
(
X
K
) 1
σ K
Y
)
=A+ log
(
Y
1−θ
θ K
σ−1
σ X
1
σ
− 1
θ
)
=A+
(
1− θ
θ
)
y +
(
σ − 1
σ
)
k +
(
1
σ
− 1
θ
)
x
and (because L = 1)
ωL =A+ log
((
Y
X
) 1
θ
(
X
L
) 1
σ L
Y
)
=A+ log
(
Y
1−θ
θ X
1
σ
− 1
θ
)
=A+
(
1− θ
θ
)
y +
(
1
σ
− 1
θ
)
x
3.C.3 Parameter space
To calculate the derivative of each factor share with respect to the log relative
price of capital p note that
dωZ
dp
=
dωZ
dk
dk
d(mpk)
d(mpk)
dp
For a fixed interest rate, the user cost condition implies that d(mpk)dp = 1.
The middle term in the chain is negative and depends on the curvature of
the production function. So for both the labour share and capital share (and
hence investment rate) to be increasing in the relative price of capital, as
suggested by the econometric evidence in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014)
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and this paper respectively, we require
dωL
dp
<0
dωK
dp
<0
The elasticities of output and the subfunction X with respect to capital are
equal to the factor shares of capital in each, so the parameter condition for
the labour share is(
1− θ
θ
)
ωK +
(
1
σ
− 1
θ
)
ωK
ωK + ωL
< 0
and for capital is(
1− θ
θ
)
dy
dk
+
(
1
σ
− 1
θ
)
dx
dk
+
σ − 1
σ
< 0
Setting the labour and capital shares {ωL, ωK} to reasonable values of 0.6
and 0.25 respectively (such that the share going to entrepreneurial labour
M is 0.15), figure 3.23 displays the region of the parameter space in which
both conditions are met. The elasticity of substitution between capital and
unskilled labour σ must lie in a region around unity that is increasing in
size the further below unity is the elasticity between entrepreneurial labour
M and the other factors.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. A fall in the relative price
of capital increases the quantity of it employed in production, for a given
interest rate. For fixed supply of unskilled labour L and entrepreneurial
labour M , an increase in K means an increase in the intermediate aggregate
X and, for θ < 1, a fall in the income share going to X. If the substitutability
between K and L in X (i.e. σ) is low, then the rise in K pushes up the
share of L in X quickly enough to offset the fall of the share of X in overall
output, and the labour share rises. Conversely, if σ is high enough, then in
response to the increase in K the capital share in X will rise quickly enough
to allow it (and therefore the nominal investment rate) to rise as a share of
Y . The further θ is below unity, the more that the overall share of X falls,
and so the bigger is the region of σ in which these offsetting effects do not
dominate.
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Chapter 4
The banks that said no:
banking relationships,
credit supply and
corporate outcomes in the
United Kingdom
4.1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008 was associated with falls in corporate lending,
business investment, labour productivity and real wages in the United King-
dom. What were the causal links between these events? Did firms retrench
because they could not get financing? Or did they become pessimistic about
demand for their products, and demand both less financing and fewer fac-
tors of production as a result? Empirical research in this area is only just
beginning to address adequately the issue of causation.
This paper provides new evidence on the impact of the credit supply
shock on corporate outcomes in the UK. Our aim is to identify what the
impact of the reduction in credit supply following the 2007/8 financial crisis
has been on wages, investment, employment and labour productivity. We
employ a new identification strategy that exploits information on pre-crisis
credit relationships within a large firm-level dataset of UK companies. We
the banks that said no
exploit the stickiness of these relationships, together with the fact that dif-
ferent banks tightened credit conditions to different degrees, to generate
exogenous variation in credit supply at the firm level. This instrument for
credit supply can be used to quantify the impact of a given change in credit
volumes on firm outcomes.
Controlling for demand conditions in the product market and condi-
tional upon firm survival, we find that firms facing a reduction in credit
supply experienced greater falls in capital investment and labour productiv-
ity. Capital per worker fell significantly more in firms facing tighter financing
conditions. This may be due to an increase in the shadow price of capital
causing firms to substitute towards more labour-intensive technologies in
production. Wages fell further in firms more exposed to the credit shock,
and in similar proportion to labour productivity, even though these firms
were hiring labour in the same markets as less exposed firms. This obser-
vation lends support to rent- or risk-sharing theories of wage determination
(see e.g. Van Reenen (1996)) - firms were able to share some of their id-
iosyncratic productivity shocks with their workers. We also find that firms
facing adverse credit supply shocks were more likely to fail
In the UK, firms are required to register the identity of any party (a
‘chargeholder’) that has a claim on the firm’s assets as collateral for a loan.
We construct a proxy for pre-crisis banking relationships by identifying UK
banks among these chargeholders. We show that these relationships are
persistent, and that they help to predict the amount firms borrow after the
crisis.
Our identifying assumption is that banking relationships are only corre-
lated with firm outcomes through their effect on credit supply, conditional
on the control variables in our model. This puts our paper in a similar vein
to Chodorow-Reich (2014), who looks at employment in US firms, Edgerton
(2012) (equipment spending in California), Paravisini, Rappoport, Schnabl,
and Wolfenzon (2011) (exports in Peru), Amiti and Weinstein (2013) (in-
vestment in Japan) and Bentolila, Jansen, Jimnez, and Ruano (2013) (em-
ployment in Spain). It will be violated if the banks which cut lending most
during the crisis lent to firms which performed systematically worse, con-
trolling for observables, whether this is due to reverse causation (bad firms
harming their banks) or common causation (bad or risky decisions in sev-
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eral parts of the bank). We provide narrative evidence that the main cause
of variability in banks’ performance after the crisis was not their corporate
lending decisions. Unlike a number of papers in this field, our identification
strategy allows us to report standard tests of overidentifying restrictions,
which are typically not rejected. We discuss how they are affected by the
endogenous attrition in our sample. Our instruments are shown to be strong,
and our parameter estimates are statistically significant and economically
large, but only when we address the endogeneity of credit volumes with two-
stage least squares - OLS estimates are typically much smaller in absolute
value, and statistically less significant. We show that this is consistent with
highly variable credit demand shocks at the firm level.
Relative to the existing literature, our study makes two principal contri-
butions. First, our paper is the first to our knowledge to look at the effect of
the credit shock on labour productivity and wages in the cross section, both
of which have been puzzlingly weak in the United Kingdom and a number
of other economies after the financial crisis. Second, our paper is the first
to use bank relationships to study the credit shock in the United Kingdom,
an economy which is both heavily dependent on banks and which suffered a
relatively large credit shock.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 4.2
we discuss how our work relates to existing studies of the impact of credit
on corporate outcomes. Section 4.3 provides a brief overview of the be-
haviour of key macroeconomic variables in the UK since the 2008 crisis, and
the structure of the UK banking system and corporate sector. Section 4.4
presents the dataset used in our analysis. Section 4.5 sets out our empirical
methodology. Section 4.6 presents our results and compare them to existing
estimates from the literature. Section 4.7 gauges the economic magnitude
of our results. Lastly, we conclude in section 4.8 with an interpretation of
our key results and suggestions for further work in this area.
4.2 Existing literature
The existing literature on the impact of credit on the macroeconomy can
broadly be split into two strands.
The first strand uses aggregate macroeconomic data and time series
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econometric methods to identify the impact of a credit shock on the real
economy. For example, Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012b) examine the re-
lationship between credit spreads and economic activity in the time series.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2012) find that output growth following financial crises
remains persistently weak for longer than recessions that are not associ-
ated with financial crises. Oulton and Sebastia-Barriel (2013) use a similar
dataset and find that financial crises are associated with prolonged periods
of weak TFP growth.
The second strand, which relates more directly to our work, uses mi-
croeconometric techniques to identify the impact of a credit shock in the
cross section. Several papers use pre-crisis variation in exposure to different
lenders as a means of generating cross-sectional variation in credit supply
during the crisis. (Peek and Rosengren (1997)) find that Japanese banks
cut lending in the US following deterioration in their parent banks’ capital
positions, and these authors go on to show with regional data that this in
turn affected US construction activity (Peek and Rosengren (2000)). Amiti
and Weinstein (2013) use matched Japanese bank-firm data over the period
1990-2010 to decompose loan movements into bank, firm, industry and com-
mon shocks. They find that idiosyncratic bank shocks have a large effect
on investment. Greenstone and Mas (2012) use geographic variation in the
pre-crisis market share of different banks across the US, along with varia-
tion in the credit crunch across banks, and finds that US counties in which
poorly performing banks had bigger market shares saw fewer new loans, less
employment and fewer business start-ups during the crisis. Their empirical
model assumes that each bank’s loan growth in each county is the sum of
county fixed effects, bank effects (varying over time for each bank) and an
idiosyncratic shock. The predicted credit supply shock for each county is the
average of the bank-time shocks, weighted by each bank’s pre-crisis market
share in that county. The measure is correlated with county-level loan and
employment growth in the crisis, but not before.
Chodorow-Reich (2014) measures banking relationships by identifying
the lead arrangers for a given firm’s syndicated loans and showing that
bank-firm pairs are sticky. He finds that employment fell more sharply dur-
ing the crisis among the clients of less healthy lenders, particularly when
those clients were small firms. The withdrawal of credit can explain roughly
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one-third of the employment decline in the sample in the year following the
Lehman collapse. Edgerton (2012) uses data on lending relationships for
a sample of equipment finance loans to identify the impact of restricting
supply of credit to firms. Again he uses ‘distressed’ lenders as a proxy for
restricted credit supply. He finds that variation across lenders account for
a 17% decline in aggregate equipment financing, or about one-third of the
total decline in financing in the sample of small businesses used in the pa-
per. Paravisini et al. (2011) estimate the elasticity of exports to credit using
matched Peruvian customs and firm-level bank credit data. To account for
non-credit determinants of exports, they compare changes in exports of the
same product and to the same destination by firms borrowing from banks
differentially affected by the 2008 financial crisis. The results suggest that
the credit shortage reduces exports through raising the variable cost of pro-
duction, rather than the cost of financing sunk entry investments. Flannery,
Giacomini, and Wang (2013) find that US firms which had relationships
with banks with higher non-performing real estate loans borrowed less and
invested less during the crisis.
Ongena, Peydro, and Horen (2013) examine how corporate outcomes of
firms that are dependent on credit differed from those that are not credit
constrained. They focus on firms located in Eastern Europe and Asia as
that region was not initially affected by the global financial crisis. Their
identification strategy relies on distinguishing between 3 types of banks ac-
cording to whether they are domestic or foreign-owned and whether they
can borrow on the international wholesale market. They find that banks
with access to international wholesale funding cut back their lending by
more than domestic banks who didn’t; and that firms dependent on credit
from those banks had lower returns on asset growth and revenue growth.
Bentolila et al. (2013) merge the Spanish credit register with balance sheet
data and find that Spanish firms who entered the crisis with relationships
to weak banks experienced larger falls in employment.
In summary, there is a small but growing literature using bank relation-
ships to study the effect of credit supply on corporate outcomes, principally
borrowing, investment and employment. Our paper is the first to do so in
the UK, and the first to look at capital intensity, labour productivity and
wages.
120
the banks that said no
4.3 Macroeconomic context
This section discusses the macroeconomic context for the research question,
namely the weakness in productivity in the UK since the crisis (subsec-
tion 4.3.1) and the relationship between the UK banking and non-financial
corporate sectors (subsection 4.3.2).
4.3.1 Productivity, investment and employment in the United
Kingdom after the 2008 crisis
In common with many other industrial countries, the UK experienced a
deep recession during the 2008 financial crisis. Since the crisis, labour pro-
ductivity has been exceptionally weak in relation to its previous trend and
past financial crises. It has also been weaker in the UK than in most other
industrial countries (Barnett, Batten, Chiu, Franklin, and Sebastia-Barriel
(2014)). This weakness in productivity has been puzzling, and is explained
by surprisingly weak unemployment rather than weak output. It has co-
incided with a sharp fall in UK corporate borrowing (Figure 4.1) and real
wages. A key question is the extent to which the disruption in credit supply
witnessed during the 2008 crisis has been a cause of the weakness in capital
formation, productivity and wages.
4.3.2 Banks and corporate borrowing in the United King-
dom
Firms in the United Kingdom are highly dependent on banks as a source of
debt finance: the approximately 250 UK firms with access to public bond
markets account for only about 12% of UK private employment. In their
reliance on banks instead of bond markets, UK firms are much closer to
continental European firms than US firms; bank loans account for about
three-quarters of euro area corporate debt, about two-thirds in the UK,
and about one-quarter in the US (Pattani, Vera, and Wackett (2011)). So
variation in the credit supplied by banks is, for most UK firms, coterminous
with variation in overall credit supply.
The banking sector is highly concentrated in the UK - the top six banks
account for about 70% of the stock of lending to UK firms (Bank of England
(2013)). The major UK banks - Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group and
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RBS (the Royal Bank of Scotland) - experienced widely differing fortunes
during the financial crisis that began in 2008. In particular, Lloyds Bank
and HBoS (Halifax Bank of Scotland) merged to form the Lloyds Banking
Group and were subsequently part-nationalised by the UK government, as
was RBS. Chart 4.2 shows the premia on credit default swaps on the senior
unsecured bonds of the big four UK banks, a measure that is highly corre-
lated with their funding costs. These were low and similar before the crisis,
and high and dispersed afterwards.
A necessary condition for our identification strategy is that this disper-
sion was not in large part caused by systematic differences in the health of
UK banks’ corporate loan books. Official narrative accounts of the failures
of HBoS and RBS (FSA (2011) and PCBS (2013)) support this idea, laying
the blame instead on trading book losses and reliance on wholesale funding.
The key exception to this is the particularly large losses made in RBS’ and
HBoS’ commercial real estate (CRE) portfolios. For this reason, and in line
with Bentolila et al. (2013), we exclude CRE firms from our sample.
4.4 Data description
Our dataset is compiled from information taken from the Bureau Van Dijk
FAME database. This extracts information from UK companies annual
accounts that are submitted to Companies House. This database contains
information on around 1.3m registered UK companies. These data provide
a range of balance sheet as well as profit and loss accounting information
about individual companies.
4.4.1 Sample selection
A key variable of interest for our study is the level of total debt held by
individual companies, which we define as the sum of overdrafts, short term
loans and long term debt. The sample used in our analysis is based on all
companies that reported a nonzero level of total debt in 2007 - giving us a
total sample size of around 90,000 firms. We then track what happened to
these companies in the two subsequent years. However, reporting restrictions
and thresholds mean that only a subset of these companies will report data
on all the variables of interest.
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There are three main issues with the way we have selected our sample.
First, the panel is unbalanced, since not all firms will submit data for every
variable in each period (depending, inter alia, on whether they meet the ap-
propriate reporting thresholds), particularly but not exclusively if they are
liquidated. Second, since there are various accounting exemptions available
for SMEs, they will be underrepresented in our sample relative to the popu-
lation of firms. In subsection 4.4.3 we describe how the firm size distribution
in our sample compares to the population. Third, we do not observe the
effect of credit supply shocks on entry and firm creation, nor on firms which
existed but had been denied credit in prior to the crisis.
4.4.2 Chargeholder information
Our identification strategy relies on information regarding pre-crisis rela-
tionships between companies and individual banks. To get this we extract
information on registered charges from the BvD FAME database. A charge
is the security a company gives for a loan and must be registered at Com-
panies House (the UK business registry) within 21 days. There are two
types of charge: a fixed charge is a charge or mortgage secured on particu-
lar property; and a floating charge can be against all the company’s assets,
such as stock in trade, plant and machinery and vehicles. The BvD FAME
database captures information on persons entitled to an outstanding charge
raised at Companies House. It also includes information on when the charge
was created and when it ended (when the loan matured). The way in which
we encode this information for our econometric analysis is set out in section
4.5.
Figure 4.6 shows the proportion of companies that started with an out-
standing charge in 2007 with one of the four major UK banks and tracks
whether or not they still had an outstanding charge to that particular insti-
tution in subsequent years. By the end of the sample period around 90% of
companies still had an outstanding charge registered to the same institution
as they did in 2007. Figure 4.6 also shows the proportion of companies that
started off with an outstanding charge to one of the four major UK banks in
2007 and tracks whether or not a new charge was registered with a different
institution. The chart shows that by 2011 only around 5% of companies had
raised a charge with a different institution to the one they had an outstand-
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ing charge with in 2007. This suggests banking relationships - or at least
the proxy in our dataset - appear to be very sticky.
4.4.3 Summary statistics
This subsection provides an overview of the key variables we use in our
estimation strategy.
Summary statistics of key variables
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for the left- and right-hand variables
in our regressions, discussed in more detail in the next section. As is typically
the case in firm-level data, the distributions of all our variables are heavily
skewed to the left. For the analysis in the remainder of this paper, we remove
firms in the 1st and 99th percentiles from each variable, to ensure that our
results are not distorted by any outliers or extreme observations.
Size and industry distributions
Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of companies across three firm size bands:
small, medium and large. Since information on the number of employees
is less regularly reported than turnover, we use turnover our measure of
firm size. Small firms, defined as companies with a turnover of less than
6.5 million, make up the vast majority of our sample. According to the
2012 Business Population Estimates (ONS (2013)), small firms (in those
statistics defined as firms with fewer than 50 employees) represent around
99% of UK companies. As described earlier, the reason for this difference is
that smaller firms are not required to submit full annual accounts and will
in many cases, therefore, be excluded from our sample. Figure 4.3 shows a
reasonable correspondence between the proportion of companies in different
industries in our sample and in the population.
Bank market shares
Figure 4.5 below shows the proportion of companies with an outstanding
charge registered at Companies House in 2007 within our sample. RBS
and Lloyds had the largest market shares at 17% and 12% respectively,
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consistent with their dominance of the UK corporate lending market during
that period.
4.5 Empirical approach and identification strategy
The availability of credit enables firms to invest, pay workers and buy inter-
mediate goods before the revenues they create are generated. A disruption
in credit supply in the form of a change in the terms on which a firm can
access debt financing will therefore affect the ability of a firm to conduct
its business. Our aim is to quantify the effect of a credit supply shock on
various measures of firm i′s behaviour at time t - principally investment,
productivity and turnover - represented by the variable yit, conditional on
other time-invariant covariates xi. This is the parameter β in equation (4.1)
yit − yi,2007 = βt(dit − di,2007) + γxi + it (4.1)
where we measure a credit supply shock in terms of its effect on the volume
of credit di the firm owes, holding demand fixed, and where xi is a vector
of time-invariant firm characteristics. One reasonable alternative to this
specification would be to group banks according to whether they are strong
or weak, and therefore more or less likely to provide credit, and then perform
a diff-in-diff analysis comparing firms who have relationships with these two
groups. The problem with this approach is that it is not obvious how to
group banks. On one hand, banks like RBS and Lloyds became so weak
that they were nationalised. On the other, nationalisation itself may have
prompted a change in lending policy and actually boosted credit supply
from the affected banks (see Rose and Wieladek (2014) for evidence that
nationalisation affected the lending of UK banks).
At the level of a firm, the amount a firm borrows will be driven by both
the supply of and demand for credit. For example, a firm might reduce
borrowing because of a reduction in credit supply, but also because it might
want to dispose of physical capital or otherwise alter its capital structure.
In each case, the correlation between credit and investment will be different.
So a simple OLS regression of, say, investment on the change in debt will
typically deliver biased estimates of the effect of a credit supply shock.
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To see the determinants of the OLS bias, consider a very simple model
of borrowing (d), output (y) and credit supply (perfectly elastic at interest
rate r) at the firm level
d =α1y + α2r + d (Credit demand)
r =s (Credit supply)
y =γ1s + y (Output)
In terms of the exogenous shocks of the model, realised output and borrowing
are given by
d =α1 (γ1s + y) + α2s + d
= (α1γ1 + α2) s + α1y + d
y =γ1s + y
If we were simply to regress output on credit volumes, the expected value
of our OLS parameter estimate would be
E
[
βˆOLS1
]
=
cov(y, d)
var(d)
=γ1
σ2s (α1γ1 + α2)
(α1γ1 + α2)
2 σ2s + α
2
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2
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Now suppose we have an instrument b which is correlated with credit
supply but uncorrelated with any of the other shocks, such that b = µs+b.
In expectation, our IV estimator is then
E
[
βˆIV1
]
=
cov(y, b)
cov(d, b)
=
E [(γ1s + y) (µs + b)]
E [((α1γ1 + α2) s + α1y + d) (µs + b)]
=
γ1µσ
2
s
µ (α1γ1 + α2)σ2s
=
γ1
(α1γ1 + α2)
This is the effect of credit supply shocks on output normalised by their effect
on borrowing. Relative to this parameter, the OLS estimator is biased for
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two reasons. First, the bias is an increasing function of α1σ
2
y - i.e. output
shocks will bias the OLS parameter upwards to the extent that borrowing
is an increasing function of output and that there are output shocks in the
sample. Intuitively, if credit volumes are strongly increasing in output, and
output varies autonomously a great deal, the parameter estimate in an OLS
regression of output on credit volumes will be revised upwards. Secondly,
credit demand shocks will bias the parameter towards zero, as they will raise
the variance of the right-hand side variable in the regression.
For this reason, we adopt an instrumental variables approach. For each
of the firms in our sample, we have information about the identity of any
legal person with a charge on the assets of the firm. When the chargeholder
is a bank, we take this as evidence of a possible banking relationship between
the firm and the bank. These relationships are in turn an indicator of firm-
specific credit supply on account of two features of the UK banking system
in the recent crisis: the stickiness of banking relationships (subsection 4.4.2),
and the exogenous differences across banks in the severity with which they
were hit by the credit shock (section 4.3.2).
Our dataset is an unbalanced panel of firms, so we could in principle
estimate a variant of equations 4.2-4.3 below in levels terms rather than
first differences, controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity us-
ing standard methods. This approach would, however, suffer from a number
of important problems. Most obviously, the credit shock itself varied over
time and affected each bank differently over our sample. Furthermore, our
identifying strategy relies on using pre-crisis banking relationships as an in-
strument for firm-level credit supply. Over the passage of time, for a variety
of reasons, banking relationships will change and end. This means that the
coefficients of equation 4.2 are highly likely to be unstable over time, and
we verify that this is the case in the next section.
We therefore estimate our model in terms of changes between the year
2007, before the most serious phase of the credit crisis, and each of the
post-crisis years 2008-2009 in our sample. Beyond 2009, our identification
strategy begins to fail as pre-crisis banking relationships have longer to de-
cay, and do so non-randomly, so we do not present results for later years.
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Our model - estimated by two-stage least squares - is thus
(dit − di,2007) = θbi + ξxi + µi (4.2)
yit − yi,2007 = β ̂(dit − di,2007) + γxi + it (4.3)
where bi is an indicator of the identity of the bank with which firm i had
relationships before the crisis, explained in more detail above. This is similar
to a time-differenced version of the specification in Paravisini et al. (2011).
We encode the bank relationships as a set of seven binary dummy vari-
ables. Each of four dummies represents a firm having a relationship with
exactly one of the big four banks - Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds (including HBoS)
and RBS (including NatWest) - given the relative infrequency with which
other banks appear in our sample. The remaining three respectively code
for more than one relationship with one of the big four, a relationship with a
bank outside the big four, and a relationship with a non-bank. The vector of
control variables consists of a constant, dummy variables for the industrial
sector of the firm, and dummy variables for whether the firm is a subsidiary,
a parent company or a standalone firm. Our IV results are qualitatively ro-
bust to reasonable alternatives to this scheme. For example, we get similar
results (not reported here) when we code a relationship with each of the big
banks in a separate dummy variable, irrespective of whether the firm has
relationships with other banks.
Our identifying assumption is that the identity of a firm’s bank is only
correlated with its performance, conditional on observables, through the
effect that bank identity has on credit supply. In terms of equations 4.2-4.3,
validity requires that
E[ibi] = 0. (4.4)
Put another way, banking relationships are only valid instruments if, as well
as being correlated with credit supply, they are also uncorrelated with any
other determinants of our dependent variable we do not control for.
There are two principal reasons why this might not be the case. First,
there could be reverse causation, i.e. from firm performance to credit supply
rather than vice versa. If the firms who had relationships with a given bank
performed systematically worse (conditional on observables) than others, say
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because that bank had selected riskier or less promising borrowers than oth-
ers, causation could run from corporate performance to bank relationships
- violating our identifying assumption.
Second, there could be selection on unobservables, whereby a firm’s per-
formance and the lending behaviour of its bank are influenced by a common,
unobserved factor. For example, suppose a given bank took above-average
risks on both sides of its balance sheet in the lead-up to the crisis. In the
event of a system-wide financial shock, its lending would have contracted
more than average on account of funding difficulties, and its borrowers may
have performed less well than average because they were more exposed to
the economic cycle. We would then observe a conditional correlation be-
tween performance and borrowing at the firm level, but it would not be
causal - another violation of our identifying assumption.
We can provide two kinds of evidence in support for our identifying
assumption. First, we report in section 4.6 standard tests of overidentifying
restrictions, which are typically not rejected at standard significance levels.
Where they are rejected, this may be due to the role of credit supply in
firm attrition, as set out in subsection 4.5.1 below. Second, as referred to in
section 4.3, there is narrative evidence that the main cause of variability in
banks’ performance after the crisis was not their corporate lending decisions.
4.5.1 Credit supply and firm survival
When firms cease to operate, the left-hand side variable is typically not
recorded or recorded at zero (such that the log difference is undefined), so
the firm in question is dropped from the sample. So the preceding analysis
can necessarily only be done on the intensive margin - i.e. on those firms
which do not cease to function for reasons of credit supply or otherwise. An
interesting question is whether this sample attrition is random or not with
respect to the other variables in our model. It seems likely that changes in
credit supply will influence firm survival. But with our dataset we can also
quantify the impact of credit supply shocks on firm survival. We attempt
to quantify this below.
Our identification strategy involves predicting the cumulative change in
borrowing between 2007 and another year on the basis of time-invariant
variables observed in 2007. This means that we can evaluate the predicted
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change in a firm’s borrowing among dead firms, i.e. how much a firm with
similar pre-crisis characteristics would have been expected to borrow had
it survived. This is a natural metric with which to assess the impact of
predicted borrowing, and in particular the contribution of bank identity to
it, as a determinant of firm survival. We construct a binary cumulative
failure indicator fit taking the value of zero if firm i is alive in year t and 1
if the firm failed in or before year t.1 We then run logit regressions of firm
failure or survival on the predicted value of credit supply, plus the non-bank
controls in equation (4.2)
f∗it = αt∆̂di + βtxi + uit (4.5)
Pr(f∗it > 0) = F (α∆̂di + βxi) (4.6)
The estimated coefficient on credit supply will therefore capture the effect
that credit supply, as identified with bank ID and measured in units of credit
volumes, has on bank survival. A negative coefficient would mean that firms
which would have been able to borrow more, had they survived, would have
been less likely to fail.
To the extent that credit supply affects firm survival, it may also affect
the results of the standard tests of overidentification restrictions used to as-
sess instrument validity. Standard tests of overidentifying restrictions work
by looking how far from zero our sample analogues b′ˆ of the population mo-
ment conditions E [ibi] = 0 are. However, if there is nonrandom attrition
in our sample, tests based on such overidentifying restrictions are unlikely
to work. In particular, if the disturbances in the observation equation  are
correlated with those in the selection equation u, and our instrument d is a
determinant of the latent selection variable f∗ (this is a necessary condition
for identification), then in general our instrument will be correlated with
the disturbances in the observation equation, conditional on them being
observed, i.e.
E
[
b′|f∗ > 0] 6= 0
To see this, assume that the moment condition E[b′] = 0 holds in the
1We create a proxy for firm death by looking at whether a firm’s status (when the data
were collected) is not ‘active’ and looking for the first year in which balance-sheet data
such as assets are either zero or missing: we assume the firm failed in that year.
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population. However, what we observe is instead the sample analogue of
E [b′|f∗ > 0]
E
[
b′|f∗ > 0] =Eb [E [b′|f∗ > 0, b]]
=Eb
[
b′E [|f∗ > 0, b]]
=Eb
[
b′E
[
|αt∆̂di + βtxi + uit > 0, b
]]
=Eb
[
b′E
[
|uit > −αt∆̂di − βtxi, b
]]
Suppose for the sake of illustration that u and  are both mean zero, and
jointly normally distributed with covariance σu. Then
Eb
[
b′E
[
|uit > −αt∆̂di − βtxi, b
]]
=Eb
b′σu
σ
φ
(
−αt∆̂di−βtxi
σ
)
1− Φ
(
−αt∆̂di−βtxi
σ
)

6=0
So in general, even if our identifying restrictions hold, our instruments will be
correlated with the residuals in the second-stage equations for the continuous
variables. The intuition is that our instruments determine selection, so they
will be systematically related to the unobserved variables u in the selection
equation among surviving firms. The latter will be related systematically to
the unobserved variables  to the extent that firms which are more likely to
survive are also more likely to invest, hire labour, and so forth. This means
that our instruments can be correlated with the residuals of the second-stage
equation, invalidating tests of validity based on overidentifying restrictions.
We may therefore reject the null of validity more frequently than indicated
by the significance level of the test.
4.6 Results
This section of the paper present our results. Subsection 4.6.1 sets out our
baseline results. Subsection 4.6.2 presents tests of the robustness of these
results. And subsection 4.6.3 provides results disaggregated along various
dimensions.
131
the banks that said no
4.6.1 Baseline results
First stage regression
Table 4.3 sets out the results of the first stage regression (equation 4.2) of the
change in credit volumes on our vector of identifiers for bank relationships bi
and (not shown) our additional observable controls xi, a vector of dummies
of the industrial sector of the firm and whether it is a subsidiary of other
firms. The four columns show the results in four different cases, depending
on whether we are measuring the change from 2007 to 2008 or 2009, and
whether we are using all available observations in a given year, or restricting
ourselves to firms for which data is available in both years.
The last two rows of the table show that the regression as a whole and the
bank dummies are highly significant, with the p-values of the null hypotheses
that all variables or the bank dummies can be omitted very close to zero,
even though the R2 of the regression is small. The dummies themselves are
precisely estimated and in many cases bilaterally significantly different from
each other.
Second stage regression
Tables 4.4 - 4.8 set out the results of the second stage regressions (equation
4.3). The eight columns in each table show all possible permutations of the
time period in question (whether we are measuring changes from 2007 to
2008 or 2009), whether the sample is balanced or unbalanced (i.e. whether
we restrict attention to observations available in both years), and whether
we use OLS or 2SLS as our estimator. The rows of the table show the
estimated parameter β and its (robustly) estimated standard error in square
brackets, the number of observations used, the R2 of the regression, the
Sargan statistic of overidentifying restrictions and its p-value, and the F-
statistic of the signficance of the first stage of the regression, again with its
p-value.
Table 4.4 shows the results with turnover per head - our measure of
labour productivity - as the dependent variable. In both years, and for both
samples, the OLS estimates of β are economically very small and statis-
tically insignificant. In contrast, our IV estimates are economically large
and relatively precisely estimated. Based on the argumentation in section
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4.5, the apparent bias towards zero in the OLS numbers is evidence that
credit demand shocks are an important source of variation at the firm level,
relative to shocks to credit supply and output.
Interpreting the numbers, column (2) shows that a credit shock that
reduces a firm’s level of borrowing by 1% in 2008 reduced labour produc-
tivity by around 0.8%. The diagnostic tests reported with the regression
suggest that any bias in this estimate is unlikely to be very large due to
any problems with instrument validity and/or relevance: the Sargan test of
overidentifying restrictions (where the null is that our instruments are valid)
is not rejected at standard levels for either year, while the F-statistic for the
joint significance of the instruments suggests that chance of a large weak
instrument bias is low for 2008 (Stock and Yogo (2002)).
Comparing the unbalanced sample estimates for 2008 and 2009, we see
that the estimated parameter falls approximately 2.5 standard deviations
from 0.78 to 0.45. There are at least three reasons, two econometric and
one economic, why this might be the case. First, the instruments are weaker
for 2009, which may be one reason why the estimated coefficient is smaller in
absolute value (i.e. it may be biased towards the OLS parameter). Second,
the sample shrinks between the two years, in part because some of the
firms in the 2008 sample had gone bankrupt by 2009. In the (likely) event
that some of this attrition is non-random with respect to credit supply, the
effect we observe among surviving firms will be different; it is noteworthy in
this regard that the difference between the estimates for 2008 and 2009 is
smaller on the balanced sample. Third, the effect of a persistent credit shock
on productivity may fade over time, as firms have more time to reorganise
production or finance expenditures with internal funds.
Table 4.5 shows analogous results for capital per head.2. Once again the
IV estimates of β are reasonably well-determined and much larger in absolute
value than their OLS analogues although, in contrast to the productivity
regressions, the latter are now statistically significant. The 2SLS coefficients
now get somewhat bigger over time, perhaps as firms have more time to
adjust their factors of production.
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 separately show how credit shocks affect the numer-
ator and denominator of capital per worker. As with previous results, we
2To proxy productive capital we use tangible assets
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find that our IV estimates are generally well determined and larger in ab-
solute value than the OLS numbers. The results show that the adjustment
in capital per worker was driven more by capital in 2008 than 2009. The
results on employment are surprising at first sight - they show no effect on
employment in 2008 but by 2009 a credit shock that reduced borrowing by
1% by 2009 relative to 2007 was associated with an approximately 0.5% rise
in employment among surviving firms.
One interpretation of this result is that the credit shock raised the
shadow interest rate. The up-front costs and duration of returns to cap-
ital are longer than those to labour, such that a rise will cause firms to
substitute towards labour and away from capital. It is important to em-
phasise that this result does not predict that aggregate employment will
rise in response to an adverse credit shock, for at least two reasons. First,
our method implicitly partials out the demand conditions that firms face by
comparing employment growth across firms operating in the same markets
but with different banking relationships. Second, we only quantify these
effects among surviving firms: to the extent that firm-level credit supply
shocks cause firms to go bust (and hence to cut employment to zero), their
overall effect is of ambiguous sign. An estimate of the effects of firm-level
credit shocks on firm survival is presented below.
Finally among our benchmark results, table 4.8 shows our estimate of the
effect on wages (per head) of a firm-level credit shock that reduces borrowing.
As above, the IV estimates are much larger in absolute value than their
OLS analogues, and suggest that a firm-level credit shock reduces wages
in approximately the same proportion as it reduces debt. This suggests
that firms were able to share some of the costs by the credit shock with
their employees, and relatedly that these firms were operating in a labour
market that was non-Walrasian to an important extent, such that wages
were not equalised across similar employees but differed ex post according
to the credit supply experienced by their employers. Comparing them to
table 4.4, it seems that firms in our sample were able to cut wages per head
by somewhat more than the fall in productivity per head.
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Credit supply and firm survival
Table 4.9 sets out our estimates of the parameter α in equation 4.5, the
effect of a reduction in credit supply on the probability of firm death. The
results are negative and significant for all years under consideration. A neg-
ative parameter means that higher predicted credit supply (i.e. the amount
a firm’s borrowing would have changed conditional on survival based on
its banking relationships and other observables) increases the probability
that the firm survived up until the period in question. This suggests that
a widespread contraction in credit supply will tend to increase corporate
insolvencies across the economy, an effect we quantify in section 4.7
4.6.2 Robustness tests
Our identifying strategy works by exploiting variation across banks in the
changes in the terms on which they supplied credit during the financial cri-
sis. This variation was likely to have been relatively large during the period
of funding and credit market turbulence, asset-price volatility and bank na-
tionalisation of 2008-9. Conversely, if our instruments are valid and banking
relationships are randomly assigned with respect to corporate outcomes, our
instruments are more likely to be only weakly relevant at a time of tran-
quil market conditions. But if there is also endogenous variation in bank
relationships that is relevant for credit supply and corporate performance,
violating our identifying assumptions, then our instruments could turn out
to be relevant when they should not be.
With this in mind, we re-run the regressions above but substitute 2005
in place of 2007 for our sample selection rule3 and as the base year against
which changes in debt, productivity and so on are measured. Tables 4.10-
4.14 present the results and are analogous to tables 4.4-4.8 discussed above.
In contrast to our baseline results, the F-statistics for the first-stage re-
gressions and the associated IV estimates of β are typically insignificant at
standard levels. The only exception to this is when capital is the dependent
variable and the change is measured between 2005 and 2007, in which case
the F-statistic indicates that our instruments are significant. This could be
3that is, we select firms in the Bureau Van Dijk database who had a positive level of
debt in 2005 rather than 2005
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a false positive, or could suggest that the market turbulence experienced in
the second half of 2007 - which culminated in the UK with the nationalisa-
tion of Northern Rock - may already have been having an effect on the real
economy. However, in no case are our instruments relevant in 2006.
In summary, the failure of our identification strategy when used to iden-
tify credit shocks before the credit crisis (when the variation across banks
in credit supply was more limited) provides greater confidence that we are
indeed picking up credit supply shocks - and nothing else - in our baseline
results for 2008-9.
4.6.3 Disaggregated results
The following subsection disaggregates the firms in our sample by size (sub-
subsection 4.6.3) and then by age (subsubsection 4.6.3). For brevity, we do
not report OLS results. We disaggregated the sample along various other
margins but did not obtain meaningful results, and therefore do not report
these exercises.
Disaggregation by size
Tables 4.15 to 4.19 set out estimates of the parameter β in equation 4.3 where
the sample has been split into firms with turnover above and below 50m (the
standard criterion for ‘small business’ in UK statistics). This corresponds
to around the 90th percentile of the turnover distribution in our dataset.
For brevity, we drop the OLS results from the table. The F statistics from
the first stage regression are typically highly significant but in single figures,
suggesting that weak instruments bias may be more of a problem in our dis-
aggregated samples. Table 4.15 does not present a consistent picture of the
relative importance of credit shocks for the productivity of small and large
firms. Table 4.16 suggests that capital per head adjusted proportionally
more in large firms, with coefficients in the range of 0.7-1 rather than 0.5,
although this evidence is fairly weak. Table 4.17 shows that capital adjusted
much more among larger firms, although our identification seems to be weak
among the smaller firms, such that this result may be a statistical artefact
from weak identification among the latter. Table 4.18 shows the same for
employment - an apparently larger (negative) response among large firms,
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and weak identification among small firms. Finally, table 4.19 shows that
the coefficient for wages per head is apparently similar between small and
large firms, with some identification questions among small firms in 2009.
To summarise, there is some weak evidence that large firms adjusted factors
of production proportionally more than small firms in response to the credit
shock, but none that productivity or wages behaved differently.
Disaggregation by age
Tables 4.20 to 4.24 repeat the exercise in the previous subsubsection but dis-
aggregate firms by (above and below median) age rather than by size. And
as with that exercise, the F statistics, while highly significant, again suggest
that the issue of weak instruments bias may affect the results somewhat.
With this caveat in mind, however, table 4.21 suggests that older firms ad-
justed capital per head more than younger firms, with more adjustment in
both the numerator and the denominator. This may be because they are
themselves larger.
4.7 Economic magnitude
It is not straightforward to translate our microeconometric findings into
macroeconomic numbers. But the simple calculations in this section show
that the impact of the credit shock on the macroeconomy may have been
substantial.
In a logistic regression such as that defined by equations 4.5-4.6, a slope
parameter α implies that a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable
increases the odds of the event by a factor eα. So our estimate of the
parameter α in the survival equation 4.6 of around -7.5 suggest that a credit
supply shock that would reduce borrowing by 10% in the event the firm
survives would raise the odds of bankruptcy by about e.75 ≈ 50%. Corporate
liquidations in England and Wales, a close proxy in the aggregate data (ref
to QB) rose by around two-thirds in the course of the crisis that began in
2008, while the stock of corporate debt fell by about one-third relative to
its pre-crisis trend path (figure 4.1). For the sake of illustration, if even
one-third of this fall in corporate debt represented a credit supply shock,
then the shock could in turn account for most of the rise in insolvencies at
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this time.
Turning to the impact on surviving firms, our baseline estimates suggest
that a contraction in credit supply sufficient to reduce borrowing by 10%
over 2008 would have reduced productivity by about 7% among our sample
of firms. Productivity (GDP per head) fell by approximately 3% in the UK
over the course of 2008, and had fallen by about one-sixth relative to trend
by 2013 (Barnett et al. (2014)). Even after allowance is made for the fact
that firms without debt may have been less affected, it is still possible to
account for a substantial part of the weakness in UK productivity on the
basis of these estimates.
4.8 Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on the impact of the credit supply shock
caused by the financial crisis of 2008 on corporate outcomes in the UK. Con-
trolling for demand conditions in the product market and conditional upon
firm survival, we find that firms facing a reduction in credit supply experi-
enced greater falls in capital investment and labour productivity. Capital
per worker fell significantly more in firms facing tighter financing conditions.
This may be due to an increase in the shadow price of capital causing firms to
substitute towards more labour-intensive technologies in production. Wages
fell further in firms more exposed to the credit shock, and in similar pro-
portion to labour productivity, even though these firms were hiring labour
in the same markets as less exposed firms. We also find that firms facing
adverse credit supply shocks were more likely to fail.
Our identifying assumption is that banking relationships are only corre-
lated with firm outcomes through their effect on credit supply, conditional
on the control variables in our model. We provide narrative evidence that
the main cause of variability in banks’ performance after the crisis was not
their corporate lending decisions, and report standard tests of overidenti-
fying restrictions, which are typically not rejected. Our instruments are
shown to be strong, and our parameter estimates are statistically signifi-
cant and economically large, but only when we address the endogeneity of
credit volumes with two-stage least squares - OLS estimates are typically
much smaller in absolute value, and statistically less significant. We show
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that this is consistent with highly variable credit demand shocks at the firm
level.
The limitations of our identification strategy, which relies on pre-crisis
banking relationships that decay non-randomly over time, mean that we
are unable to say how persistent the corporate sector was damaged beyond
the first two years after the financial crisis. On the intensive margin, it
could be that firms are somehow permanently scarred by temporary credit
shocks, or it could be that they are able to catch up to the counterfactual
no-crisis path once the credit shock abates. And on the extensive margin,
this study does not tell us how firm entry is affected by financial crises, so
we cannot say what happens to the factors that become unemployed when
firms fail, either during or after the period of crisis. The durability of the
productivity slowdown following the crisis make this an important avenue
for future research.
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Figure 4.1: UK macroeconomic data, log-linearly detrended
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of firm sizes
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of sectors
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Figure 4.5: Market shares of the major banks
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Figure 4.6: Charge durations and switching behaviour
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Figure 4.7: Corporate liquidations in England and Wales
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics, 2005 to 2011
Variable Mean Median Min Max Obs
[St. Dev]
Total debt (£’000s) 43,709 563 1 753,000,000 354,332
[1,500,246]
Capital (£’000s) 15,629 290 1 43,100,000 460,195
[351,876]
Capital per worker (£’000s) 259 18 0 453,333 153,726
[4,305]
Turnover per head (£’000s) 340 127 0 291,235 117,173
[2,655]
Remuneration per head (£’000s) 34 28 0 3,410 154,727
[32]
Number of employees 637 76 1 639,964 160,354
[7,023]
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables in 2007
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4
Tangible assets (’000 ) 23,869 22,188 18,529 28,947
[302,440] [184,333] [114,892] [483,617]
Employment 351 302 490 413
[1,428] [1,438] [2,542] [6,049]
Turnover (’000 ) 45,703 35,213 68,354 56,310
[145,564] [114,438 ] [322,248] [833,066]
Turnover per head 379 240 237 239
[4,954] [737] [810] [582]
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Table 4.3: First stage regression, baseline sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
unbalanced unbalanced balanced balanced
VARIABLES 2008 2009 2008 2009
justbarc 07 -0.078*** -0.074*** -0.113*** -0.074***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
justhsbc 07 -0.071*** -0.089*** -0.107*** -0.089***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
justlbg 07 -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.102*** -0.078***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
justrbsnw 07 -0.059*** -0.053*** -0.084*** -0.054***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
any2or3or4 07 -0.047*** -0.035*** -0.073*** -0.029**
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
othermfi07 -0.053*** -0.045*** -0.078*** -0.041***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
chargenonmfi07 -0.052*** -0.057*** -0.083*** -0.058***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Observations 54,432 41,537 38,365 38,365
R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.006
F statistic 12.61 9.449 16.71 9.692
p value of regression 0 0 0 0
p value of all banks 0 0 0 0
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Table 4.9: Firm survival logit regression, baseline sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EQUATION VARIABLES 2008 2009 2010 2011
failedever predicted debt -7.360*** -7.200*** -8.094*** -8.005***
[0.93] [0.69] [0.69] [0.93]
Observations 82,624 82,709 82,725 82,725
pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.236 0.217 0.196
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